Indonesia, the Cold War and Non-Alignment: Relations of the Early Indonesian Cabinets with the United States, 1950-52*

Richard Mason

doi:10.32890/jis.6.2010.7906

Abstract

Indonesia, the Cold War and Non-alignment: Relations of the Early Indonesian Cabinets with the United States, 1950-1952. The Cold War initially focused on Europe but promptly spread to encompass the entire globe. By the early 1950s, the Cold War belligerents began to compete for the allegiance of the newly independent nations. Many of the newly independent nations, however, had from the outset, preferred not to choose sides in the Cold War. India, Burma and Indonesia had all purported to pursue a policy of neutralism and non-alignment in the Cold War. This paper discusses the attempts of the newly independent Republic of Indonesia to steer a policy of nonalignment in the Cold War and the challenges thereto posed by the United States' Cold War policies during the early 1950s. It traces the experiences of the Hatta, Natsir and Sukiman cabinets, 1950-1952. The central theme of the paper is the interplay between the Indonesian policy of non-alignment in the Cold War and the US policy of containment. The paper argues that despite their profession to non-alignment, the early Indonesian cabinets had leaned towards the United States. Indonesia fell with the Anglo-American economic and military orbit. Desirous of American aid, Indonesia increasingly compromised on its stance of nonalignment in the Cold War. The dilemma of dependence proved to be a major stumbling block in Indonesia's attempt to pursue non-alignment.

Highlights

The Cold War was a term coined to describe the state of the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union after the end of the Second World War
This paper discusses the attempts of the newly independent Republic of Indonesia to steer a policy of nonalignment in the Cold War and the challenges thereto posed by the United States' Cold War policies during the early 1950s
It is the hope of the [State] Department that should the mainland be lost through Communism, Indonesia might provide a base of operations from which anti-Communist forces in Asia could begin recovery of the mainland.”[6]. NSC 48, a State Department position paper on Southeast Asia, approved by the President in December 1949, stated US objectives in Indonesia : In Indonesia, the United States should seek to strengthen the non-Communist political orientation of the government, promote the economic development of Indonesia and influence Indonesia toward greater participation in measures which support the security of the area and Indonesia solidarity with the free world.[7]

Summary

Introduction

As Assistant Secretary Walton Butterworth put it in a memorandum in October 1950 to Secretary Acheson: “As Communist gains on the Asiatic mainland increase, the importance of keeping Indonesia in the antiCommunist camp is of greater and greater importance It is the hope of the [State] Department that should the mainland be lost through Communism, Indonesia might provide a base of operations from which anti-Communist forces in Asia could begin recovery of the mainland.”[6] NSC 48, a State Department position paper on Southeast Asia, approved by the President in December 1949, stated US objectives in Indonesia : In Indonesia, the United States should seek to strengthen the non-Communist political orientation of the government, promote the economic development of Indonesia and influence Indonesia toward greater participation in measures which support the security of the area and Indonesia solidarity with the free world.[7]. The history of US-Indonesian relations during the early 1950s depicted the American attempt to co-opt and coerce Indonesia to abandon non-alignment and to enter into an active alliance with the United States in the Cold War

The Hatta Cabinet

The Natsir Cabinet

Conclusion