Individuals in Aristotle's "Categories": Two Queries

Abstract

M vR r. Barrington Jones, in his recent article in Phronesis,I has suggested a new way of solving standing debate about nature of non-substance individuals in Categories. Mr. Jones' article suggests some exciting new approaches to Categories, but I would like to put forward two difficulties I find with way he proposes to cut through main problem. In Categories, but nowhere else, there seem to be individuals in non-substance categories, corresponding to primary substances. WhIat sort of thing are these non-substance individuals? According to Ackrill2 they are non-repeatable individual instances of (for example) a property. An example would be particular instance of white exhibited by this paper: it is peculiar to this piece of paper and will perish when it does. According to Owen3 they are most specific types of (for example) a property. The white exhibited by this piece of paper and all paper in same batch would be an example: it can continue to exist when this piece of paper perishes, as long as some other piece of paper from batch continues to exhibit it. I shall not go into controversy that has arisen over these differing interpretations of Aristotle. I have more limited objective of examining way Jones proposes to restate terms of debate. If Jones is right alternatives just sketched represent a false dichotomy: new solution supersedes them both. It is merely proffered new solution that is my concern. Jones begins from fact that the term 'individual' is glossed as 'what is in number',4 and goes on to explain this in terms of Aristotle's analysis of one in Metaphysics I.6 In I Aristotle analyses