Abstract

Cooperation is key for the evolution of biological systems ranging from bacteria communities to human societies. Evolutionary processes can dramatically alter the cooperation level. Evolutionary processes are typically of two classes: comparison based and self-evaluation based. The fate of cooperation is extremely sensitive to the details of comparison based processes. For self-evaluation processes, however, it is still unclear whether the sensitivity remains. We concentrate on a class of self-evaluation processes based on aspiration, where all the individuals adjust behaviors based on their own aspirations. We prove that the evolutionary outcome with heterogeneous aspirations is the same as that of the homogeneous one for regular networks under weak selection limit. Simulation results further suggest that it is also valid for general networks across various distributions of personalised aspirations. Our result clearly indicates that self-evaluation processes are robust in contrast with comparison based rules. In addition, our result greatly simplifies the calculation of the aspiration dynamics, which is computationally expensive.

Highlights

  • Cooperation is forgoing the focal individual’s own interest to benefit others

  • The evolutionary outcome is the same as if all the individuals adopt the same aspiration for regular networks, provided the selection intensity is weak enough

  • Our result shows a very robust class of strategy updating rules. It implies that complexity in updating rules does not necessarily lead to the sensitivity of evolutionary outcomes

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Summary

Author summary

Cooperation is the cornerstone to understand how biological systems evolve. Previous studies have shown that cooperation is sensitive to the details of evolutionary processes, even if all the individuals update strategies in the same way. We propose a class of updating rules driven by self-evaluation, where each individual has its personal aspiration. The evolutionary outcome is the same as if all the individuals adopt the same aspiration for regular networks, provided the selection intensity is weak enough. We provide a simple numerical method to identify the favored strategy. Our result shows a very robust class of strategy updating rules. It implies that complexity in updating rules does not necessarily lead to the sensitivity of evolutionary outcomes

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