Abstract
The paper examines the theory and practice of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) in fisheries. Using the experience of several countries, a number of ITQ programmes are examined with respect to fisher compliance and their effect upon economic efficiency, employment, the harvesting shares of fishers, cost recovery and rent capture. This paper was prepared for a general readership including fisheries managers and scientists. Readers interested in a more theoretical treatment are referred to Arnason (1990) and Boyce (1992).
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