Abstract
AbstractThis chapter explores Hegel's account of the ‘concrete universal’ as a distinctive metaphysical response to the problem of individuality, which concerns what makes something an individual. It is argued that Hegel introduced his notion of the concrete universal to avoid Platonism on the one hand (which leaves insufficient room for individual particulars) and nominalism on the other (which reduces that particularity to an empty haecceity or ‘thisness’). Important challenges to Hegel's position within the continental tradition are then considered, particularly that offered by Gilles Deleuze.
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