Abstract

Fuzzy-trace theory predicts that decisionmakers process numerical information about risk at multiple levels in parallel: the simplest level, nominal (categorical some-none) gist, and at more fine-grained levels, involving relative comparison (ordinal less-more gist) and exact quantities (verbatim representations). However, little is known about how individual differences in these numerical representations relate to judgments and decisions, especially involving health tradeoffs and relative risks. To investigate these differences, we administered measures of categorical and ordinal gist representations of number, objective numeracy, and intelligence in two studies (Ns=978 and 956). In both studies, categorical and ordinal gist representations of number predicted risk judgments and decisions beyond objective numeracy and intelligence. Participants with higher scores in categorical gist were more likely to choose options to avoid cancer recurrence risks; those who were higher in ordinal gist of numbers were more likely to discriminate relative risk of skin cancer; and those with higher scores in objective numeracy were more likely to choose options that were numerically superior overall in terms of relative risk of skin cancer and of genetic risks of breast cancer (e.g., lower numerical probability of cancer). Results support parallel-processing models that assume multiple representations of numerical information about risk, which vary in precision, and illustrate how individual differences in numerical representations are relevant to tradeoffs and risk comparisons in health decisions. These representations cannot be reduced to one another and explain psychological variations in risk processing that go beyond low versus high levels of objective numeracy.

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