Individual differences in action co-representation: not personal distress or subclinical psychotic experiences but sex composition modulates joint action performance.

Anouk van der Weiden,Henk Aarts,Neeltje E. M. van Haren,Merel Prikken

doi:10.1007/s00221-015-4475-6

Anouk van der Weiden, Henk Aarts + Show 2 more

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00221-015-4475-6

Copy DOI

Abstract

Successful social interaction requires the ability to integrate as well as distinguish own and others’ actions. Normally, the integration and distinction of self and other are a well-balanced process, occurring without much effort or conscious attention. However, not everyone is blessed with the ability to balance self–other distinction and integration, resulting in personal distress in reaction to other people’s emotions or even a loss of self [e.g., in (subclinical) psychosis]. Previous research has demonstrated that the integration and distinction of others’ actions cause interference with one’s own action performance (commonly assessed with a social Simon task). The present study had two goals. First, as previous studies on the social Simon effect employed relatively small samples (N < 50 per test), we aimed for a sample size that allowed us to test the robustness of the action interference effect. Second, we tested to what extent action interference reflects individual differences in traits related to self–other distinction (i.e., personal distress in reaction to other people’s emotions and subclinical psychotic symptoms). Based on a questionnaire study among a large sample (N = 745), we selected a subsample (N = 130) of participants scoring low, average, or high on subclinical psychotic symptoms, or on personal distress. The selected participants performed a social Simon task. Results showed a robust social Simon effect, regardless of individual differences in personal distress or subclinical psychotic symptoms. However, exploratory analyses revealed that the sex composition of interaction pairs modulated social Simon effects. Possible explanations for these findings are discussed.

Highlights

As social beings, we develop great expertise in reading other people’s intentions, actions, and emotions
In the present study, using a well-documented complementary action task that taps into these self–other integration and distinction processes (Dolk et al 2013; Sartori and Betti 2015; Sebanz et al 2003), we investigate the robustness of self–other distinction in social interaction, as well as its susceptibility to individual differences in traits related to self–other distinction
To assess the extent to which experiences of personal distress in reaction to other people’s emotions and psychotic experiences reflect excessive integration of self and other, we aimed to test (1) the robustness of the social Simon effect, and (2) whether individual differences in personal distress and subclinical psychotic symptoms are reflected in enhanced social Simon effects

Summary

Introduction

We develop great expertise in reading other people’s intentions, actions, and emotions. It allows people to take into account, or integrate, the actions and emotions of others and to react (e.g., to pass someone on the right when that person is going left, or to offer consolation when someone is feeling sad). This neural network that allows self–other integration allows people to distinguish own and others’ actions and emotions, as it is generally more active for own compared with others’ actions and emotions (Mukamel et al 2010). In the present study, using a well-documented complementary action task that taps into these self–other integration and distinction processes (Dolk et al 2013; Sartori and Betti 2015; Sebanz et al 2003), we investigate the robustness of self–other distinction in social interaction, as well as its susceptibility to individual differences in traits related to self–other distinction.

Objectives

Results

Conclusion