Abstract
In this paper, we propose three methods to compare the manipulability degrees of two groups of Social Choice Correspondences (SCCs); the Scoring Rules and the Condorcet rules. We pick one rule from the first group, the Borda rule, and three from the other, the Copeland rule, the Topset and the Uncovered set. Therefore, we run three extension rules for our analysis; the Lexicographic extension rule (Leximax), the Max-Min ordering and the Expected ranking. Our findings based on our main methods with their sub-methods support that the Borda rule is more manipulable than the aforementioned Condorcet rules.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
