Indistinguishable Leakage-Resilient Circuit Compiler

Abstract

Abstract Transforming any circuit into a circuit with the same functionality but resilience against well-defined classes of leakage is an essential subject of cryptography. Whereas, according to the relationship between $VBB$ and simulated leakage-resilient circuit compiler, the compiling needs a specific mechanism to guarantee that its input is free of any leakage. Unfortunately, it makes it tough to implement this strategy in the context of actual leaks. In this work, we formally propose the indistinguishable bounded leakage-resilient circuit compiler $\bar{C}$ to solve the problem mentioned above. Specifically, it specifies that any polynomial-time adversary who derives the bound secret information from the circuit compiler can not distinguish an equivalent compiled circuit $\bar{C}^{\prime}$ with the same output. To achieve this goal, first, we utilize the leakage-resilient indistinguishable encoding as its input. Second, it takes advantage of the indistinguishability obfuscation $(IO)$ program to construct an obfuscated circuit that removes the random coins of the input encoding . Its total running time is the original circuit $C$ running time plus $poly(\kappa )$, and the size is independent of the original $C$. As this new compiler overcomes the restriction of the simulated-based leakage resilient circuit compiler,it will bring an independent interest result in leakage-resilient cryptography.