Abstract

Indirect reciprocity involves cooperative acts towards strangers, either in response to their kindness to third parties (downstream) or after receiving kindness from others oneself (upstream). It is considered to be important for the evolution of cooperative behavior amongst humans. Though it has been widely studied theoretically, the empirical evidence of indirect reciprocity has thus far been limited and based solely on behavior in laboratory experiments. We provide evidence from an online environment where members can repeatedly ask and offer services to each other, free of charge. For the purpose of this study we created several new member profiles, which differ only in terms of their serving history. We then sent out a large number of service requests to different members from all over the world. We observe that a service request is more likely to be rewarded for those with a profile history of offering the service (to third parties) in the past. This provides clear evidence of (downstream) indirect reciprocity. We find no support for upstream indirect reciprocity (in this case, rewarding the service request after having previously received the service from third parties), however. Our evidence of downstream indirect reciprocity cannot be attributed to reputational effects concerning one’s trustworthiness as a service user.

Highlights

  • In modern economies the increasing importance of online commerce has lead to a mushrooming of interactions amongst strangers

  • Our results provide first solid evidence from the field of downstream indirect reciprocity

  • We found no support for upstream indirect reciprocity

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Summary

Introduction

In modern economies the increasing importance of online commerce has lead to a mushrooming of interactions amongst strangers. This leads to a growing need for mechanisms that govern such interactions. Many transactions require mutual trust and cooperation to succeed In this respect, interactions amongst strangers are no different than many other economic interactions; they heavily rely on implicit contracts [1]. Strategies involving indirect reciprocity can evolve under evolutionary pressures and result in a cooperative steady state [4]. This makes indirect reciprocity a strong economic force.

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