Indirect Lightning Safety Assessment Methodology

Abstract

Lightning is a safety hazard for high-explosives (HE) and their detonators. In the However, the current flowing from the strike point through the rebar of the building The methodology for estimating the risk from indirect lighting effects will be presented. It has two parts: a method to determine the likelihood of a detonation given a lightning strike, and an approach for estimating the likelihood of a strike. The results of these two parts produce an overall probability of a detonation. The probability calculations are complex for five reasons: (1) lightning strikes are stochastic and relatively rare, (2) the quality of the Faraday cage varies from one facility to the next, (3) RF coupling is inherently a complex subject, (4) performance data for abnormally stressed detonators is scarce, and (5) the arc plasma physics is not well understood. Therefore, a rigorous mathematical analysis would be too complex. Instead, our methodology takes a more practical approach combining rigorous mathematical calculations where possible with empirical data when necessary. Where there is uncertainty, we compensate with conservative approximations. The goal is to determine a conservative estimate of the odds of a detonation. In Section 2, the methodology will be explained. This report will discuss topics at a high-level. The reasons for selecting an approach will be justified. For those interested in technical details, references will be provided. In Section 3, a simple hypothetical example will be given to reinforce the concepts. While the methodology will touch on all the items shown in Figure 1, the focus of this report is the indirect effect, i.e., determining the odds of a detonation from given EM fields. Professor Martin Uman from the University of Florida has been characterizing and defining extreme lightning strikes. Using Professor Uman's research, Dr. Kimball Merewether at Sandia National Laboratory in Albuquerque calculated the EM fields inside a Faraday-cage type facility, when the facility is struck by lightning. In the following examples we will use Dr. Merewether's calculations from a poor quality Faraday cage as the input for the RF coupling analysis. coupling of radio frequency (RF) energy to explosive components is an indirect effect of currents [1]. If HE is adequately separated from the walls of the facility that is struck by disassembled have been turned into Faraday-cage structures to protect against lightning is initiation of the HE. last couple of decades, DOE facilities where HE is manufactured, assembled, stored or lightning. The most sensitive component is typically a detonator, and the safety concern lightning, electrons discharged from the clouds should not reach the HE components. radio receiver, the metal cable of a detonator can extract energy from the EM fields. This to the earth will create electromagnetic (EM) fields in the facility. Like an antenna in a