Abstract

We discuss the links between rights appropriation, tenure security, and investment demand in sub-Saharan Africa. Common assertions regarding indigenous tenure are: 1. (a) insecurity of tenure leads to suboptimal investment incentives; and 2. (b) appropriation of land rights in the public domain is rent-dissipating. We argue that land use and investment decisions among African farmers often have two motives — productivity and rights appropriation. The usual assertions thus seem contradictory. We offer a conceptual model to show that indigenous tenure may provide equal or higher investment incentives than private rights, and may promote modes of rights appropriation that are productive rather than wasteful.

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