Abstract
Power indices in simple games measure the relevance of a player through her ability in being critical, i.e. essential for a coalition to win. We introduce new indices that measure the power of a player in being decisive through the collaboration of other players. We study the behavior of these criticality indices to compare the power of different players within a single voting situation, and that of the same player with varying weight across different voting situations. In both cases we establish monotonicity results in line with those of Turnovec [1998]. Finally, we examine which properties characterizing the indices of Shapley–Shubik and Banzhaf are shared by these new indices.
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