Indicator Contents

Abstract

In this chapter I argue that indicator contents cannot be explanatorily relevant in constitutive mechanistic explanations of cognitive phenomena. The argument relies on the observation that indicator contents are based in conditional probabilities. I first argue that these probabilities must be viewed as physical chances rather than epistemic probabilities or credences. Then I examine the most prominent views on the nature of physical chances to figure out which states of affairs are described by the claim that a neural vehicle carries a particular content. I show that, under both frequentist and propensity interpretations of chances, the property of carrying representational content X is not local to any cognitive phenomena. Furthermore, I show that this property is only mutually dependent with cognitive phenomena under a long-run propensity interpretation of physical chances. However, owing to the failure of locality, I conclude that indicator contents are never explanatorily relevant in constitutive mechanistic explanations in neuroscience.