Abstract
ABSTRACT This paper will examine four crises that took place between India and Pakistan, in the period in which they were declared nuclear powers. It shows that by combining threats and reassurance, Indian leaders sought to avert nuclear use, while deriving strategic and diplomatic gains from the presence of nuclear weapons. While scholars differ as to whether India-Pakistan crises should be termed “nuclear crises”, this paper asks instead how one state – India – behaves during crises, simultaneously drawing attention to, and downplaying its nuclear dimensions. The first section of the paper explains the role of reassurance in the complex game of deterrence. The second section provides a brief summary of the India-Pakistan nuclear relationship. The four crises are analyzed in the third section. Each crisis is first summarized, and the words and deeds that New Delhi chose to signal reassurance are highlighted. The fourth and final section evaluates whether the nuclear danger can be thus managed through the calibration of threat and reassurance. It identifies three factors that impede signals of reassurance, and cautions that the balance between threat and reassurance is too delicate to be relied on to keep the peace between India and Pakistan.
Highlights
The relationship between India and Pakistan is characterized by intense crises at irregular intervals
The second section provides a brief summary of the India-Pakistan nuclear relationship
It identifies three factors that impede signals of reassurance, and cautions that the balance between threat and reassurance is too delicate to be relied on to keep the peace between India and Pakistan
Summary
The relationship between India and Pakistan is characterized by intense crises at irregular intervals. An example, discussed below, was India’s choice to restrict conventional military operations during the Kargil War. The three main factors at play in the strategic relationship between India and Pakistan are nuclear weapons, terrorism, and the concerns of the international community – the United States. The world feared that the Manmohan Singh government in New Delhi – a few months away from a tough general election – would retaliate with military action, that could escalate to nuclear war During this tense period, Pakistani officials at one point seriously feared a surprise air attack, and at another were shaken by a hoax caller pretending to be the Indian Foreign Minister (Abbas 2008; Coll 2009). Politicians must eschew ultranationalist posturing, both during crises and otherwise
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