Indian Theories of Truth: Their Common Framework

Abstract

Abstract In this chapter, I want to begin by reflecting not on some one or other amongst the theories of truth (prāmānya) in Indian philosophy, but rather on that common framework which encompasses them all, or perhaps the most important amongst them, or on that common horizon within which these theories and their mutual dialogues have moved. Taken separately, there are, in the large spectrum of the Indian philosophies, theories that exhibit remarkable affinities to the major Western theories of truth. Thus the Nyaya theory of truth is a sort of correspondence theory, the Mimǡmsǡ a sort of self-evidence theory, and the Buddhist a sort of pragmatic theory. There are theories, such as the Nyaya, which combine a correspondence theory of the nature of truth with a sort of coherence theory and a sort of ]Pragmatic theory of the test of truth. Some others, like the Mimamsa, question the very distinction between the nature and the test of truth. Comparative philosophy, bent on tagging theories on to theories, promises to be a rewarding enterprise.