Indian Attitudes on International Atomic Energy Controls

Abstract

T HE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY of i968 has been in effect since March 5, 1970, when the fortieth non-nuclear-weapon state deposited its instruments of ratification in Washington, Moscow, and London. Although almost a hundred nations have now signed the treaty, the lack of support by several threshold states will vitiate some of its significance. The most prominent recalcitrants are the two nuclear-weapon states, France and China, which refused even to participate in the negotiations leading to the drafting of the treaty in the years i965-i968. In addition, Japan and West Germany-the world's third and fourth ranking countries in terms of Gross National Product-despite their belated signatures on the treaty in the winter of i969-70, are not expected to ratify the agreement in the near future. Each has its particular significant reservations about total adherence. Several other potential nuclear-weapon states have also failed to sign the treaty. Israel, Australia, the Union of South Africa, and Indonesia have not yet given their support; nor have the three largest countries of South America-Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. India, the second most populous nation in the world, is of especial concern to proponents of the treaty because of the advanced state of its civilian nuclear technology, its strategic geographic position, and its passionate espousal of most previous international efforts at arms control. In addition, as long as India refuses to sign, Pakistan can be expected to follow suit. India's attitude toward the non-proliferation treaty is frequently misunderstood by many who assume that the Indian signature will come in due time.1 Such speculation fails to realize that the Indian decision not to sign reflects several years of deliberate modification of previous Indian foreign policy. As early as i965, India's attitude toward international cooperation in matters of arms control had given evidence of becoming less internationallyoriented and more concerned with considerations of national security and internal development. The final decision on the non-proliferation treaty was simply the ultimate culmination of this adjustment.