India’s Response to China’s Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean

Abstract

The dominance of the marshals in the Chinese Central Military Commission was for years assumed to ensure that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) would overall follow a continental strategy in which maritime strategy is subordinated to continental defense. But in recent years pressure has increased to develop a new maritime strategy in keeping with the Politburo's ambitions for to become a world power. This trend began to build up from 2012 onward, but it is in the 2015 white paper China's Military Strategy that we see the first overt signal of becoming a maritime power:The seas and oceans bear on the enduring peace, lasting stability and sustainable development of China. The traditional mentality that land outweighs the sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests. It is necessary for to develop a modern maritime military force....for building itself into a maritime power. The traditional mentality that land outweighs the sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests.1The 2015 white paper may be said to give political clearance to the following goals:* the funding of the PLA Navy (PLAN) to become a world-class navy* the protection of China's prime sea lines of communication (SLOC), including those in the Indian Ocean* the eventual deployment of the PLAN wherever Chinese interests existThe 2015 white paper goes on to talk of joining other naval forces to protect international SLOCs; the importance of Chinese SLOCs in the Indian is of such magnitude that a permanent Chinese presence in the ocean is certain.This essay examines China's maritime strategy in the Indian and possible Indian responses. It first considers why is interested in the Indian Ocean, before turning to analyze PLAN operating requirements there. The essay then concludes by assessing the implications and options for India.China's Interests in the Indian OceanAccording to one estimate, China imports 82 per cent of its energy requirements, in the form of oil and gas, through the Indian Ocean and, more importantly, via the Strait.2 Without these imports, the Chinese economy would shut down. This percentage is slated to increase as China's economy grows. The Malacca dilemma, as described by Hu Jintao, is real and is a true reflection of Beijing's thinking. Bypassing the Indonesian archipelago via pipelines across Myanmar and Pakistan is not a viable option for resolving the dilemma. All signs point toward a consensus having been reached within the Chinese leadership that becoming a world power necessarily means becoming a maritime power that is capable of defending its interests in the far seas.A move toward the Indian to protect Chinese SLOCs would require the creation of supporting infrastructure for the PLAN to operate in the far seas. This maneuver would be well thought out and follow a long-standing progressive plan created over a couple of decades, including the following steps:* offering investment of capital to boost trade* offering to build infrastructure and special economic zones* obtaining an economic toehold in the Indian littoral* creating a perception of as a benefactor* making regional states indebted to China* convincing these states to provide a base for Chinese operations in the Indian OceanIn short, will use its surplus cash and economic diplomacy to create geopolitical conditions in the Indian that are favorable to pro-Beijing decisions being made.To protect Chinese SLOCs, the PLAN will require more than one base in the Indian Ocean. already has footholds in Djibouti and Gwadar covering the northwest Indian and SLOCs through the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. …