India‐Pakistan nuclear parity: Is it feasible or necessary?

Abstract

Since the May 1998 nuclear tests by India and subsequently by Pakistan, the one aspect that has run as a continuous thread through the voluminous written material that followed in their wake has been the question of nuclear parity. Nuclear parity is a multi‐dimensional word involving aspects such as basic nuclear perceptions, doctrinal approaches, nuclear command and control (C2) systems, types of delivery systems, threshold factor and, finally, size of nuclear arsenals. To achieve complete nuclear parity would in essence signify comparability in all the multi‐dimensional spheres. Within the restricted context of India and Pakistan, it is not feasible to compare most of the above stated aspects due to their conceptual and amorphous nature. However, it is possible to compare, in general terms, the level of operating C2 systems, the level of weaponisation, and in specific terms, the numbers of delivery platforms. This logically brings up the next question, that of the necessity and desirability of seeking such parity. Seeking comparisons in the nuclear field is an onerous tdsk, to an extent due to the secrecy and the variables involved, and these do not affect the deterrence levets in any case. Instead, a continuous search for parity reeks of a keeping up with the Joneses syndrome, and a conventional military mindset. It neither helps in reducing the deterrence level nor in getting recourse to reducing tensions; if anything, it may only help in enhancing budgetary allocations and the arms race.