India and the Gulf Crisis: The Response of a Minority Government

Abstract

B ETWEEN the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the allied powers' combined )attack on Iraq to liberate Kuwait, there was a shift in power in India from the Janata Dal government headed by V.P. Singh to that of the Janata(S) led by Chandra Sekhar. Chandra Sekhar's government was short lived because of its minority support. It remained in power quite precariously only for a little more than six months: from 10 November 1990 to May 1991. When the Sekhar government assumed power, there were serious dangers to India's unity and integrity, and its economy was in a shambles. The outbreak of the Gulf War further worsened India's economy, posing a serious challenge to the government. Moreover, the government was confronted with a dilemma with regard to its foreign policy: whether to throw in its lot with the allied powers who appeared to be sure winners, or to stand by a good friend like Iraq which was sure to suffer defeat. An effort has been made here to analyze the response of the Chandra Sekhar government to the Gulf war, and the strategies adopted by it in order to cope with the critical situation. Indian foreign policy has inspired many scholarly works, but their relevance for the present study is of limited value primarily because of the radical change that has occurred in the international strategic scenario with the end of the cold war. Till recently the main parameters of India's foreign policy were nonalignment and socialism which derived their sustenance from the continuance of the rivalry between the two power blocs. 1 But the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the virtual disintegration of the Soviet Union which hastened the end of the cold war forced many countries either allied or friendly to Moscow to take a serious second look at their foreign policy objectives and strategies. While military capability continues to remain one