Abstract
In this chapter, I explain and discuss Kaplan’s cases of contingent a priori truths involving pure indexicals and demonstratives, especially those containing the ‘dtaht’ operator combined with descriptions or demonstrations. I discuss two fundamental assumptions behind Kaplan’s cases, namely, that contexts of utterances are only proper contexts, and that indexicals and demonstratives always take their semantic values from the contexts of utterances (and never from other contexts). I conclude the chapter with a contrast between Kripke’s and Kaplan’s conception of contingent a priori truths.
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