Independent Fiscal Institutions at the Supranational Level: The European Fiscal Board

Abstract

This discussion paper considers the pertinence of Independent Fiscal Institutions (IFIs) to supranational contexts, along with the structural and political challenges that this transposition may entail. IFIs are typically formed to address fiscal issues in national or subnational domains, but the European Fiscal Board (EFB) provides a novel case to revisit the structure of IFIs – now in a supranational context that comprises the member states of the EU. As this paper observes, there are inherent challenges to the transposition of supranational contexts due to different fiscal situations, dissimilar fiscal priorities, and contrasting fiscal progressions. Furthermore, issues of enforcement and legitimacy, also relevant to national IFIs, manifest themselves in altered forms. The findings of the paper further suggest that the EFB is a step in forging fiscal cohesion over-and-above an extant monetary union.