Independence, Sovereignty, Preponderance – The Prevalence and the Territorial Expansion of State Power

State is society’s need for the existence of an organized power, equipped with the right equipments of coercion and able to run the society, by imposing the choices that seem reasonable to them, through legal norms. State is an organization of state power; it is an organized power which imposes its will to all the society and has a whole mechanism to execute this will. The state realizes its functions through power, which is a mechanism to accomplish its relevant functions. The power’s concept is a social concept, which can be understood only as a relation between two subjects, between two wills. Power is the ability to impose an order, a rule and other’s behavior in case that he doesn’t apply voluntary the relevant norm, respectively the right. Using state power is related to creation and application, respectively the implementation of law. To understand state power better, we have to start from its overall character. So, we notice that in practice we encounter different kinds of powers: the family’s one, the school’s one, the health’s one, the religion’s, culture’s etc. The notion of powers can be understood as a report between two subjects, two wills. Power is an order for other’s behavior. Every power is some kind of liability, dependence from others. In the legal aspect, supremacy of state presents the constitutive – legislative form upon the powers that follow after it. Supremacy, respectively the prevalence, is stronger upon other powers in its territory. For example we take the highest state body, the parliament as a legislative body, where all other powers that come after it, like the executive and court’s one, are dependable on state’s central power. We can’t avoid the carriage of state’s sovereignty in the competences of different international organizations. Republic, based on ratified agreements for certain cases can overstep state’s power on international organizations. The people legitimate power and its bodies, by giving their votes for a mandate of governance (people’s verdict). It is true that we understand people’s sovereignty only as a quality of people, where with the word people we understand the entirety of citizens that live in a state. The sovereignty’s case actualizes especially to prove people’s right for self-determination until the disconnection that can be seen as national – state sovereignty. National sovereignty is the right of a nation for self-determination. Sovereignty’s cease happens when the monopoly of physical strength ceases as well, and this monopoly is won by another organization. A state can be ceased with the voluntary union of two or more states in a mutual state, or a state can be ceased from a federative state, where federal units win their independence. In this context we have to do with former USSR’s units, separated in some independent states, like Czechoslovakia unit that was separated in two independent states: in Czech Republic and Slovakia. Former Yugoslavia was separated from eight federal units, today from these federal units seven of them have won their independence and their international recognition, and the Republic of Kosovo is one amongst them.Every state power’s activity has legal effect inside the borders of a certain territory and inside this territory the people come under the relevant state’s power. Territorial expansion of state power is three dimensional. The first dimension includes the land inside a state’s borders, the second dimension includes the airspace upon the land and the third dimension includes water space. The airspace upon inside territorial waters is also a power upon people and the power is not universal, meaning that it doesn’t include all mankind. State territory is the space that’s under state’s sovereignty. It is an essential element for its existence. According to the author Juaraj Andrassy, state territory lies in land and water space inside the borders, land and water under this space and the air upon it. Coastal waters and air are considered as parts that belong to land area, because in every case they share her destiny.Exceptionally, according to the international right or international treaties, it is possible that in one certain state’s territory another state’s power can be used. In this case we have to do with the extraterritoriality of state power. The state extraterritoriality’s institute is connected to the concept of another state’s territory, where we have to do with diplomatic representatives of a foreign country, where in the buildings of these diplomatic representatives, the power of the current state is not used. These buildings, according to the international right, the diplomatic right, have territorial immunity and the relevant host state bodies don’t have any power. Regarding to inviolability, respectively within this case, we have two groups to mention: the real immunity and the personal immunity, which are connected with the extraterritoriality’s institute.

State is society’s need for the existence of an organized power, equipped with the right equipments of coercion and able to run the society, by imposing the choices that seem reasonable to them, through legal norms. State is an organization of state power; it is an organized power which imposes its will to all the society and has a whole mechanism to execute this will. The state realizes its functions through power, which is a mechanism to accomplish its relevant functions. The power’s concept is a social concept, which can be understood only as a relation between two subjects, between two wills. Power is the ability to impose an order, a rule and other’s behavior in case that he doesn’t apply voluntary the relevant norm, respectively the right. Using state power is related to creation and application, respectively the implementation of law. To understand state power better, we have to start from its overall character. So, we notice that in practice we encounter different kinds of powers: the family’s one, the school’s one, the health’s one, the religion’s, culture’s etc. The notion of powers can be understood as a report between two subjects, two wills. Power is an order for other’s behavior. Every power is some kind of liability, dependence from others. In the legal aspect, supremacy of state presents the constitutive – legislative form upon the powers that follow after it. Supremacy, respectively the prevalence, is stronger upon other powers in its territory. For example, we take the highest state body, the parliament as a legislative body, where all other powers that come after it, like the executive and court’s one, are dependable on state’s central power. We can’t avoid the carriage of state’s sovereignty in the competences of different international organizations. Republic, based on ratified agreements for certain cases can overstep state’s power on international organizations. The people legitimate power and its bodies, by giving their votes for a mandate of governance (people’s verdict). It is true that we understand people’s sovereignty only as a quality of people, where with the word people we understand the entirety of citizens that live in a state. The sovereignty’s case actualizes especially to prove people’s right for self-determination until the disconnection that can be seen as national – state sovereignty. National sovereignty is the right of a nation for self-determination. Sovereignty’s cease happens when the monopoly of physical strength ceases as well, and this monopoly is won by another organization. A state can be ceased with the voluntary union of two or more states in a mutual state, or a state can be ceased from a federative state, where federal units win their independence. In this context we have to do with former USSR’s units, separated in some independent states, like Czechoslovakia unit that was separated in two independent states: in Czech Republic and Slovakia. Former Yugoslavia was separated from eight federal units, today from these federal units seven of them have won their independence and their international recognition, and the Republic of Kosovo is one amongst them. Every state power’s activity has legal effect inside the borders of a certain territory and inside this territory the people come under the relevant state’s power. Territorial expansion of state power is three dimensional. The first dimension includes the land inside a state’s borders, the second dimension includes the airspace upon the land and the third dimension includes water space. The airspace upon inside territorial waters is also a power upon people and the power is not universal, meaning that it doesn’t include all mankind. State territory is the space that’s under state’s sovereignty. It is an essential element for its existence. According to the author Juaraj Andrassy, state territory lies in land and water space inside the borders, land and water under this space and the air upon it. Coastal waters and air are considered as parts that belong to land area, because in every case they share her destiny. Exceptionally, according to the international right or international treaties, it is possible that in one certain state’s territory another state’s power can be used. In this case we have to do with the extraterritoriality of state power. The state extraterritoriality’s institute is connected to the concept of another state’s territory, where we have to do with diplomatic representatives of a foreign country, where in the buildings of these diplomatic representatives, the power of the current state is not used. These buildings, according to the international right, the diplomatic right, have territorial immunity and the relevant host state bodies don’t have any power. Regarding to inviolability, respectively within this case, we have two groups to mention: the real immunity and the personal immunity, which are connected with the extraterritoriality’s institute.

Government is gradually replacing anarchy in the international system, and international governance is largely accomplished by means of international organizations. International organizations have proliferated, have expanded in membership, have acquired new legal enforcement powers, and have extended their reach into the details of domestic political economy in their member states. A few, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF, or the Fund), command significant resources and wield considerable authority. International organizations are emerging as important actors in their own right, but they also remain potent power resources for influential states. The informal power that a leading state can exert through international organizations plays an important role in US foreign policy. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, international organizations had become an essential instrument of effective statecraft even for the most powerful state in the system, and for most other states under most circumstances, they were the only forums in which anything could be accomplished. International organizations are useful, to powerful and weak states alike, because they can extend credibility and legitimacy to efforts that would otherwise lack credibility and legitimacy. This often makes the difference that makes multilateral cooperation feasible; and the challenges posed by an increasingly interdependent global economy typically demand coordinated responses. The legitimacy and independence of international organizations are always provisional, because they exist in a system of states, and states enjoy very unequal power resources. In order to assure the participation of the most powerful states, international institutions have developed informal procedures that accommodate their interests.

Background: In this article, we address the legal and constitutional position, focusing particularly on the Serbian minority and other minorities in a broader context. We delve into their rights and privileges and Kosovo institutions' obligations and responsibilities concerning national minorities. Certainly, national minorities are an integral part of the population of Kosovo; they should enjoy rights and obligations arising from the Constitution and applicable laws. National minorities are an added value in every society; they enrich the mosaic of the country where they live and should be respected, promoting the values they carry and represent in society. The article pays great attention to the Serb community living in Kosovo, their rights identified by the Ahtisaari package, and the privileges that this package recognises as a minority. The Ahtisaari package acknowledges the Serbian Orthodox Church's unique status and explicitly outlines this community's representation within central institutions. This includes reserved and ensured seats in both the executive and legislative branches. At the local level, the package determines how they will be represented. Minorities are represented in the police, prosecutors' office, court, and all other public institutions. Attention has been paid towards instances of sabotage within the state and institutions of Kosovo by the Serbian community that lives in Kosovo and is influenced and directed by Serbia. Representatives of the Serbian community in Kosovo enjoy income and benefits from the state of Kosovo for the mandate they exercise. Still, their actions within the institutions tend to align with Serbia’s agendas rather than addressing the concerns of the community they are supposed to represent. Despite the absence of recognition from the state of Kosovo and partial acceptance by some Serbs living in Kosovo, it is crucial to acknowledge that Kosovo is an independent state and internationally recognised by 116 democratic states of the world. Notably, the Constitution of Kosovo, as a strong constitution, guarantees double rights in favour of the Serbian community living in Kosovo even though they constitute no more than 5% of the overall population. The research uses the descriptive analysis method, based on the precise description and in-depth analysis of the topic through gathering detailed data related to the research problem, analysing and interpreting legal texts and relevant information and privileging a certain community. These methods have been employed to compare the legislation in force with the international obligations that Kosovo has received through the comprehensive proposal for treating non-majority minorities. Results and Conclusions: Our research shows that national minorities in Kosovo are not treated equally. The Serbian community is constantly privileged and continues to be favoured by the international community, while other communities have substantial problems living in practical terms. The citizens of Kosovo understand the issue of minority rights best. Therefore, the state of Kosovo and its citizens should not allow national minorities to be discriminated against or their rights abused. Implementing the agreements reached in the dialogue, fulfilling international obligations, and advancing the rights of minorities in Kosovo is the obligation of Kosovo and its citizens. Kosovo institutions are obligated to dialogue with the Serbian community because they are part of society and must be integrated into it.

Modern political and legal theory agrees that there are three branches of government: the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. The legislature is the representative branch saddled with the responsibility of making law, the executive implements or executes the law while the judiciary serves as arbiter to interpret and declare what the law is whenever there is a dispute. The delineation of these functions in a state is done through the instrumentality of law or legislation. The importance of the existence of separate branches of government is the provision of checks and balance to stop the excesses of each of the branches. Given the importance of law in a society, the legislature occupies a prime position among state institutions. In his exposition of the primacy of the legislature, Locke wrote that the branch where the power of legislation resides typifies the sovereignty of the state. 1 Taking this point further from a modern perspective, Nwabueze notes that legislation ‘is the expression of the supreme power in the state, the distinctive mark of a country’s sovereignty, and the index of its status as an independent state. Thus, the sovereign power in a state is identified in the organ that has the power to make laws by legislation. The legislature is therefore the sovereign organ of state power’.

It is indicated that nowadays law acts as the main mechanism for regulating social relations in various spheres. Solving the task of increasing the effectiveness of legal regulation is necessary for the implementation of constitutional provisions on the formation of a legal and democratic state, increasing the protection and security of human and citizen rights and freedoms.It was determined that since the principles of the rule of law are the basic ideas on which the functioning of the rule of law is based, the initial provisions of the organization and functioning of such a state, which reflect universal human values enshrined in international normative acts and have found their consolidation in the form of constitutional norms, they have a number of features, among which can be singled out: these are the most general, initial provisions, ideas that are of fundamental importance for state authorities, determine the direction of their activities, the construction as a whole; they expressthe political and legal ideas prevailing in this state, which relate to tasks, the way of formation and exercise of state power; they are provided for by the norms of international legal acts; they must be enshrined in the norms of constitutional legislation(first of all, at the level of the Basic Law). At the same time, the rule of law is a multifaceted constitutional principle that includes a number of other principles, among which the principle of the unity of the legal space should be singled out first - the principle on which the organization of state power and local self-government is built in order to fulfill its main purpose - ensuring protection of constitutional rights and freedoms of man and citizen in all regions of our country. In the conditions of the military invasion of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine, the preservation of the unity of Ukraine is a mandatory condition for its further existence as a sovereign and independent state, the basis of which is the very provision of the unity of the legal space (the basic principle of the rule of law).

Considerable influence on modern international political and relations is carried out by international organizations and especially multinational corporations. Globalization strengthened their power perceptibly. Neither state nor international law while yet unable fully to control and regulate their within the framework of national or international right. Moreover, an international law does not yet know normative determination of concept of multinational corporation even, not to mention about normative fixing of principles of their and imperative adjusting . If the amount of intergovernmental organizations exceeds the number of the states, the amount of international ungovernmental organizations exceeds the number of intergovernmental organizations far. It follows from here, that ungovernmental organizations simply play an important role in life of international concord. Herein easily to make sure, if to remember, that international ungovernmental organizations began to arise up at the beginning of era of point-of-sale capitalism, when merchants created on your own and legal spaces, often as the proper reaction on the action of political power. So an international law, having regard to multiplicity of sources of right, enables to formulate determination of international ungovernmental organization and, consequently, ungovernmental organization of character. It is possible to consider that international ungovernmental organizations – it formed on initiative of physical or legal persons of association of members of different state belonging, realizations of international of character created with a purpose and provided with status of legal entity after a national (but not international) right. Sometimes there is a question, whether there is not certain contradiction in because international ungovernmental organization must, from one side, carry out of character, and from other – to answer the economic setting. This contradiction is taken off, if under a term noncommercial activity to understand in which, clearly, the receipt of direct income is forbidden by both certain organization and its members, and at the same time it is allowed to carry out defense of collective interests of members. International ungovernmental organization of character shows by itself the original group of pressure, that has for an object to protect interests of certain international circles from the states or intergovernmental organizations. In this sense does not mean without certain interest. Speaking about international ungovernmental organizations of character, it costs to remember international professional associations: international associations of producers or users, international federations of trade unions of office workers or workers, sporting federations or International chamber of commerce, which plays an important role in the sphere of international commercial arbitration, formulating norms and consuetude's of international trade. International ungovernmental organizations of character play a noticeable role in development of international law. International ungovernmental organization of character is not an operator in international relations, as does not get a direct income from the activity. In that time it shows by itself one of regulator mechanisms in international relations, as more frequent all takes part (straight or mediated) in the process of creation of norms of international law, carried out intergovernmental organizations.

Diplomats in Science Diplomacy: Promoting Scientific and Technological Collaboration in International Relations**

In this study, the authors use a political perspective to explore the relative global status of cities in China. Two questions are addressed. Firstly, by using international organizations as the subjects and quantitative analysis of the spatial distribution of their offices, the overall position of Chinese cities in the global distribution of international organizations is estimated. The results show that 22 Chinese cities are involved in international political affairs. Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou dominate these activities and have high political global-city status. Secondly, through qualitative analysis of Guangzhou City, the authors explore how its status as a center for international organizations has been shaped in recent years. The locational decision-making process is analyzed and the factors are demonstrated at both national and city scales. The definition of international organizations as used in this study refers not only to those supranational bodies that have the ability to manage relations across states (such as the European Union), but also those inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and diplomatic representatives and delegations that today also manage and regulate relations between and among states.

THE STORY OF AMERICAN STATE BUILDING is one in which crisis, once episodic, has become a routine feature of American politics. At the heart of this development is the modern executive: emergency powers are presidential powers. The principal objective of this article is to highlight institutional developments since the late 1960s that framed the Donald Trump administration's actions during the COVID-19 pandemic and currently roil the American state: the expansion of administrative power in the White House, which is largely unconstrained by the institutional imperatives of the bureaucracy, Congress, or state governments, and the emergence of the modern executive as the repository of party responsibility, with both Democrats and Republicans dependent on presidents for messaging, fundraising, mobilization, and programmatic action. Together, these developments form a dynamic of executive-centered partisanship—a merging of partisanship and executive prerogative characterized by presidential unilateralism, social activism, and polarizing struggles about national identity that divide the nation by race, ethnicity, and religion. Our account of executive-centered partisanship and how it affected the Trump administration's response to COVID-19 sheds new light on contemporary crisis management and the political nature of administrative power. Other presidents would have responded differently, perhaps with greater success in stemming the spread of the virus; other presidents might have attempted to centralize administrative power more aggressively in fighting the pandemic, rather than deflecting responsibility to states and private entities. Nevertheless, Trump's actions were not irresolute. They were defined by a purposeful pursuit of partisan objectives: a denigration of bureaucratic expertise and an attack on the “deep state”; the politicization and racialization of federal administrative procedures to crack down on legal and undocumented immigration; a campaign of “law and order” to quell civil rights demonstrations; and a punitive form of federalism, defined by partisan retaliation against “blue states.” Contrary to dominant analyses that paint an administration in disarray, we argue that the Trump administration responded to the crisis through a tactical redeployment of national administrative power to fulfill partisan goals, within a party system beholden to executive power.11 Nicholas F. Jacobs, Desmond King, and Sidney M. Milkis, “Building a Conservative State: Partisan Polarization and the Redeployment of Administrative Power,” Perspectives on Politics, 17 (June 2019): 453–469. As such, we conclude that given the current political and institutional context, American presidents are less likely to offer unifying leadership during national crises, or to suffer the political consequences for failing to do so. Instead of subjecting his party to the “blue wave” many Democrats hoped for, Trump's polarizing leadership agitated a highly mobilized and fiercely contested election that sharpened, rather than ameliorated, partisan conflict. Republicans did better than pre-election prognostications implied down ballot, where they gained 11 seats in the House and maintained control of most state legislatures. Moreover, Trump's term in office enabled Republicans to solidify a conservative majority in the courts. As a result, his successor, Joe Biden, came into office having to navigate public health and economic crisis with a bare majority in the Senate, statehouses and governors more deeply divided than Congress, and a judiciary in which 28 percent of all sitting judges were appointed by Trump, including three new justices on the U.S. Supreme Court. Most tellingly, despite his personal defeat, Trump reigned over his party and reveled in the adulation of its base supporters. In short, the American state offers modern presidents not only the opportunity to strengthen their commitment to partisan tactics under the cover of national emergencies, but also the power to do so without the traditional constraints of party, Congress, and the states. That this strategy mobilized the Republican base and did not arouse a national repudiation of the president's leadership is evidence of the power bestowed on the modern presidency to advance partisan objectives in a deeply divided nation. The article proceeds as follows: First, we argue that while the government's response to COVID-19 is an exceptional case, scholars often learn much about the operating dynamics of the American state by exploring how crises shape and transform certain governing commitments. Students of American politics have long argued that national crises have been central to major political developments. Therefore, the absence of transformative change in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis—the stubborn persistence of the polarizing struggles over American identity that have intensified since the late 1960s—poses hard challenges to this prevailing perspective. Second, we argue that executive-centered partisanship explains the discrepancy between received wisdom and the contemporary battle for the services of the administrative state. We identify three ways in which the Trump administration's actions revealed and reinforced the dysfunctionalism of executive-centered partisanship during COVID-19: the delegitimization of bureaucratic expertise in partisan politics; the decay of constitutional forms that sustain the division and separation of powers; and the politicization of administrative procedures and policy implementation, now central to the partisan struggle to contend with a diversifying and politically fragmented America. Each of these factors, we argue, is symptomatic of the political pathologies that fester under executive-centered partisanship. We conclude with an analysis of Trump's legacy and its effect on the first few months of Biden's presidency. We do not mean to suggest that Biden's leadership is equivalent to Trump's, or that the Democratic and Republican Parties share equal blame for routinizing presidential partisanship. Not only does the base of the Republican Party not apologize for violent insurrection and embrace conspiratorial tales about election fraud, Republican Party leaders in Congress and the states openly question foundational rules and precedent for short-term advantage. Nevertheless, from the early days of his presidency, Biden has struggled to escape from the cultural and institutional forces embedding executive-centered partisanship in American democracy. Despite claims to the contrary, Biden's early performance in office, especially with respect to the COVID-19 crisis, has reinforced the essential features of presidential partisanship.22 Nicholas F. Jacobs and Sidney M. Milkis, “Get Out of the Way: Joe Biden, the U.S. Congress, and Executive-Centered Partisanship during the President's First Year in Office,” The Forum 19, no. 4 (2021): 709–744. Trump's presidency, therefore, has further fused partisanship and executive administration, fanning, rather than dousing, the flames of social discord, all while testing the “resilience” of American democracy.33 Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (New York: Broadway Books, 2019). Emergencies have routinely engaged the potential power of the American state and served as a rallying cry to unify the nation. Yet the public health and economic crises wrought by COVID-19 revealed how the worst emergency since the Great Depression failed to free American politics and government from the conditions that deeply divided the nation. Therefore, there is a need to distinguish COVID-19 from previous crises in American political development, and to reconsider the ways in which earlier emergency responses have affected the development of the American state. To do so, we place the emergence of COVID-19 as a national crisis within a richer historical context, one that accounts for the secular development of a politicized administrative state and the deterioration of partisan organizations. Likewise, although the COVID-19 pandemic has been unique in many ways, it is a telling case for understanding the underlying factors that influence the partisan imperatives to use public crises and the authority they confer for partisan advantage. Indeed, unlike other crises fabricated for partisan objectives—for example, the “war on drugs” that Richard Nixon declared in 1971—COVID-19 posed and proved a dire threat to public health. Paradoxically, the Trump administration sought to exploit the public health emergency, even as it denied its severity. As a result, COVID-19 deepened a political crisis that for decades had politicized the administrative state, subjecting it to a contest between liberals and conservatives for its services. Our analysis takes a broader understanding of the American state. The idea of a “state” cannot be encompassed by Max Weber's definition of “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”44 Max Weber, “Politics as Vocation,” in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds. and trans., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 77–128 (originally published 1919). Especially in the United States, with its fragmentation of power, the state should be understood as “negotiated arrangements between the central government and powerful subnational units, patterns of competition and contestation among political parties, and relations among ‘public’ and ‘private’ providers of social welfare.”55 Desmond King and Robert C. Lieberman, “Review: Ironies of State Building: A Comparative Perspective on the American State,” World Politics 61 (July 2009): 547–588, at 549. The American state is not easily characterized as weak or strong—its power derives from a centralizing ambition amid a complex system of institutions that seeks to cultivate or impose a specific type of American community. This American state is a legacy of unintended consequences, historical contingency, and the unique position of the presidency in the constitutional order. In particular, the rise of the modern state, especially in a political culture that presumes to proscribe centralized power, is inextricably connected to American wars and domestic emergencies, which are frequently characterized as the moral equivalent of wars. Unlike some other republican charters, the U.S. Constitution does not have formal provisions that establish prerogative executive power in times of emergency.66 For example, Article 16 of the French Constitution explicitly allows the president to take exceptional measures “where the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the Nation, the integrity of its territory or the fulfillment of its international commitments are under serious and immediate threat” (see https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/France_2008). This provision was an important template of the Fifth Republic, formed in 1958, which transformed a parliamentary into a presidential system. However, crises have created opportunities for presidents to cut through the normal working arrangements of American politics. The central role of the presidency as a vanguard of institutional change has long been understood by scholars; furthermore, territorial expansion, globalization, and the nationalization of American political culture have encouraged the consolidation of an executive-centered state. The imperative to act—especially when confronted with the existential possibility of the state's destruction—leads to creative extensions of existing administrative power and social policy.77 Suzanne Mettler, Soldiers to Citizen: The G.I. Bill and the Making of the Greatest Generation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); William J. Barber, Designs within Disorder: Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Economists, and the Shaping of American Economic Policy, 1933–1945 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, “Regimes and Regime Building in American Government: A Review of Literature on the 1940s,” Political Science Quarterly 113 (Winter, 1998): 689–702; and Sheldon D. Pollack, War, Revenue, and State Building; Financing the Development of the American State (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009). Emergencies are not only instrumental in episodic bouts of executive aggrandizement; crises and presidential emergency powers have also entrenched the American state's more permanent features.88 Robert P. Saldin, War, the American State, and Politics since 1898 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Especially during major episodes of bellicosity, the terms of political conflict are redefined, and wartime presidents are central actors in defining these terms. Indeed, David Mayhew has written that wars “seem to be capable of generating whole new political universes.”99 David R. Mayhew, “Wars and American Politics,” Perspectives on Politics 3 (September 2005): 473–493, at 473. All-consuming emergencies open up space for presidents to act unilaterally, permitting political outcomes in both foreign and domestic policy that are largely inconceivable absent the nationalizing and centralizing tendencies of national crises.1010 William G. Howell, Saul P. Jackman, and Jon C. Rogowski, The Wartime President: Executive Influence and the Nationalizing Politics of Threat (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013). As John Lapinski demonstrates, “crises often delegitimize existing government policies that are directly and, in some cases, indirectly linked to the event.”1111 John S. Lapinski, “Policy Substance and Performance in American Lawmaking, 1877–1994,” American Journal of Political Science 52 (April 2008): 235–251, at 238. Although Congress and the courts do not vanish during protracted states of crisis or war, “modern presidents are undoubtedly the preeminent actors.”1212 Douglas L. Kriner, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010). “Reconstructive presidents,” Stephen Skowronek argues, can bring about new political orders, but they typically do so only when the prevailing regime is in disarray—after the extant regime's internal weaknesses are exposed, often because it cannot contend with governing exigencies.1313 Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton, revised ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997). Therefore, for liberals and conservatives alike, the grandeur of an energetic executive has been forged during the country's most perilous, unpredictable moments in history. More often than not, war and crisis are understood to be central to the development of foreign policy institutions within the presidency, such as the National Security Council.1414 Bryan Mabee, “Historical Institutionalism and Foreign Policy Analysis: The Origins of the National Security Council Revisited,” Foreign Policy Analysis 7 (January 2011): 27–44. However, the fact that foreign crises are so central to redefining domestic priorities for presidential administrations suggests that emergency powers cut more deeply into the fabric of the modern political system. Presidential state building is nurtured by large-scale, national crises, but the modern executive, dependent on loyal partisans, is not an institution that works on behalf of the “whole people” or rallies the country to tackle national crises through enduring reforms. Even in the work of administering less politically charged programs, such as disaster funding or decisions to close military bases, the modern presidency is electorally motivated and often acts to serve its core constituency.1515 Douglas L. Kriner and Andrew Reeves, The Particularistic President: Executive Branch Politics and Political Inequality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). During emergencies, well-organized and highly motivated factions within a single party can leverage the institution to enact unpopular and divisive schemes.1616 Daniel DiSalvo, Engines of Change: Party Factions in American Politics, 1868–2010 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). Moreover, the reliance on unilateral administrative measures to advance party objectives—disingenuously justified in the name of the “national interest”—further enfeebles legislative institutions during moments of crisis.1717 Neomi Rao, “Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the Collective Congress,” New York University Law Review 90 (November 2015): 1463–1526. With the country sharply divided by deep cultural rifts, such presidential unilateralism arouses fundamental struggles over inclusion. For a time, the executive-centered administrative state was sustained by a fragile consensus that obscured partisan conflict over national administrative power. The extraordinary crises of the Great Depression and World War II led to institutional changes and policies that subordinated partisanship to administration, consolidating a New Deal state committed to a “coalition” between partisans of executive power and the proponents of expertise, or “neutral competence.”1818 Herbert Kaufman identifies the “quest for neutral competence” and the “quest for executive leadership” as core commitments in the development of the administrative state. See Kaufman, “Emerging Conflicts in the Doctrines of Public Administration,” American Political Science Review 50 (December 1956): 1057–1073. Politics was then a search for pragmatic solutions to the challenging responsibilities that America had to assume, at home and abroad, to secure economic and national security. However, public support for the New Deal state fractured in the wake of the cultural and political upheavals of the 1960s.1919 Hugh Heclo, “Sixties Civics,” in Sidney M. Milkis and Jerome Mileur, eds., The Great Society and the High Tide of Liberalism (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2005), 53–82. The attempt to realize the Great Society exposed the liberal state's central fault lines (notably racial inequalities), and with violent upheaval in Vietnam and in the nation's urban core, the pragmatic center that buttressed the New Deal disintegrated. Once contested by conservative Democrats and Republicans as a threat to constitutional government, national administrative power gained acceptance on the right as liberalism expanded throughout the 1960s. In the wake of the cultural revolution of that decade, Republicans built a conservative base whose foot soldiers, most notably the Christian Right, rallied around the belief that liberalism had so corrupted the country that the national government had a responsibility to aggressively protect “traditional values” and uphold “law and order.”2020 Nicholas F. Jacobs and Sidney M. Milkis, What Happened to the Vital Center? Presidentialism, Populist Revolt and the Fracturing of America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), chaps. 4 and 5. As presidents have the of partisan leadership and as partisans their political to the president's personal it has become more to national from the president's In the institutional of the presidency with the of the American emergencies offer even greater opportunity for presidents to they act on behalf of their partisan As a partisanship in the United is a struggle over the of the state. has become an executive-centered struggle for the services of national administrative power. The of executive has been deepened by partisan in which Democrats and Republicans not only on of and policy but also their as existential to the American of J. H. C. David G. J. J. S. and in Science no. of this party conflict it First, since the struggles over and have partisan fundamental about it to be an have been further by the expansion of presidential power, executive to partisan conflict. As party wars have Congress, the legislative have become more dependent on presidents to cut through the and advance through executive action. During the and both Democrats and Republicans dependent on presidents to their and advance partisan through unilateral Sidney M. Milkis, H. and J. Happened to and the New American Party Perspectives on Politics Indeed, Republican presidents have the development of executive-centered partisanship. to the of social in the Richard Nixon was the first conservative president to the of national emergency with a partisan of American With a rallying cry of and Nixon new in the urban core, and abroad, in the of an presidential administration and a conservative modern Richard P. The Administrative (New York: As of the National at the time, conservatives only the work of the New Deal and Great Society the of a powerful president is to to war within his executive in to his Conservative National in in The New Republic, that the politicization of emergency powers did not at the the unilateralism in foreign had been a since the of the threat of an was to its partisan Andrew The New Presidential University of Press, the one foreign the funding of the in is an of that is in the of the American The President: (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, the other the administration's and use of presidential power a deeply partisan commitment to the and to the Republican Party with a of American power A the War on in an by modern embrace of a state. Not only did legal a of legal support for the constitutional independence under the of the in by Donald Trump's Supreme M. of during the and Law Review the White House also to centralize the Republican to transform the and into on the president's leadership in the War against Sidney M. Milkis and H. the Republican and the American Party Perspectives on Politics (September Democratic presidents have also the that crises in to their partisan dynamics are not dependent on the of the White they are to executive-centered partisanship. was on the of the economic that the country had in a presidency, it would be by the of the country of an economic despite and from partisans, the administration its partisan to health the most divisive and partisan policy with perhaps the of The consequences are Democrats in Congress from an with the legislative of his the and of crisis the president's governing strategy long the worst of the Great had As the president in the to the and Sidney Milkis, Partisan Polarization and the Administrative The Forum no. built the centralizing of his conservative and liberal to advance through executive the of a powerful but of the the and especially The 17 at 16 The of and of the to control the federal bureaucracy, and the of Richard its into the administrative presidential powers over and to management strategy directly to his for example, J. and L. and the Administration,” The Journal of 2011): and R. The of in Press, In political crises often leadership and we the for to around the political upheavals also in the community and should in the current of American presidents are to power for partisan are that presidents the were Donald Trump's of the worst national crisis since the Great Depression should have to the of “a late regime Herbert or in a political repudiation of a conservative political and the rise of a new Richard about Trump's and Biden's The Nation, at 16 The Trump presidency at of the At the Trump's about the spread of the his that the president has to battle the pandemic, Trump responsibility to state and governments, and, when for racial and in the of of for the and sought to the of public and for as the president's public amid the of the and did his months a of these only how the Trump administration failed to the threat that COVID-19 posed to public health and the D. and David Trump's The to Leadership on the New York at 16 and C. and Trump from the Trump the of partisan than attempt to the modern executive as the of the public as many and public had been to during a national crisis of the Trump further fused executive prerogative and partisanship. This was not a of Trump's many was to executive

The article shows the connection between the social constructions of political liberalism and its ontological justification in the system of J. Locke. With the help of semiotics and comparative philosophical analysis of the views of modern philosophers B. Spinoza, T. Hobbes, J. Locke, R. Filmer, J.-J. Rousseau, I. Kant, such problems as the nature of state power, the concept of freedom, natural law, social contract, the right of the people to revolution are analyzed. The semiotic context of natural law is revealed, and it is concluded that happiness, as the goal of New Age individual’s quest, according to Locke, is thought to be a rational and, therefore, a free being. Linking the natural need to be a free being not only with the organization of state power, but also with religious need, Locke concludes that political participation itself can be considered not just as a way to achieve freedom, but also as the purpose for a person to improve themselves morally and politically. For Locke, state power turns out to be an integral part of society, and the balance between them always shifts towards society as the source of the social contract. At the same time, the negative meaning of freedom in Locke prevails over the positive, saving the latter from sliding into totalitarianism of the Jacobin type, as in Rousseau. The conclusion is drawn about the relevance of ideas about the need for free choice of citizens to build a rule of lawful state and develop democracy.

1.In the question of politics, there are always three elements:- There are the people, along with what they do and what they think.- There are organizations: unions, associations, groups, committees. And political parties.2- There are organs of State power, official bodies and constitutional powers. Legislative assemblies, the office of the president, the government, local authorities.Every politics is a process of the articulation of these three elements. One can call them, simply: the people, social and political organizations, the State. A politics consists in the pursuit of objectives, in the articulation of the people, the organizations, and the State.2.There is a classical conception of this articulation.This conception says that:- Among the people, there are different ideological tendencies, linked more or less to social status, to class, to social practice. These tendencies have different objectives.- These tendencies are represented by organizations and by political parties.- These parties are in conflict for State power, and to utilize it for their objectives.Starting from these points you have four great political orientations: revolutionary, fascist, reformist, conservative.The revolutionary conception, and also the fascist, say that the conflict for State power is inevitably violent.The reformist and conservative conceptions say that this conflict can remain within constitutional norms.But these four politics are in agreement on one point: politics is the representation, by organizations, of the conflict of interests and of ideologies. And such representation has as its purpose the seizure of the State.The articulation of the people, organizations, and State proceeds via the idea of representation.3.The modern form of this idea is parliamentarism. This is the formal regime of France and Slovenia3 today.What is the general idea of parliamentarism? It is to organize representation at all levels. With the election as a central mechanism.Firstly, the tendencies present in the people can freely organize themselves into associations. They are represented, in the different aspects of their practice, by these associations or unions. They thereby express their ideas, their claims, their will, and can do so through public action (right to strike, right to demonstrate, right to publish).Among these associations, there are the political parties. The very particular feature of political parties is that they are the only ones to be directly represented in the State. Because the State is constructed by the electoral mechanism; and a candidate is claimed by a party. Consequently, the party is the representative link between the people and the State.4.In parliamentarism, politics is entirely subordinated to the State. Why? Because the only complete articulation between the three terms-people, organization, State-is realized at the moment of the vote. It is at that moment that the rep- resentation of the people in the parties also becomes a representation of parties in the State.But the vote is regulated, organized, by the State itself within a constitutional framework. One assumes that everyone accepts that framework. One therefore supposes a political consensus on the idea of representation. And at the heart of that consensus, there is the State. Popular mobilizations are only a means of pressure. Because they are incomplete articulations. They do not directly affect representations in the State. They fundamentally accept the consensus.Parliamentarism is therefore a political form which excludes ruptures. Because there is at least one thing the continuity of which is guaranteed: the State and its representative mechanism. At the level of the State, parliamentarism is conservative.5.Why is parliamentarism dominant today? Because the politics of rupture has failed. …

The article deals with some problems of a representative nature of legislative organs of the RF constituent entities arising during these organs formation and functioning, a deputy status, and a nature of a deputy mandate. The author believes that the combination of unity and diversity of organization models of the legislative power in constituent entities of the Russian Federation derives from both the peculiarities of the federal nature of the Russian State and the effective implementation of the state power. The author proposes to analyze individual elements of legal regulation of the procedure of formation of legislative (representative) organs of the RF constituent entities state power. According to the author, the federal legislator should not permit the possibility of holding elections of deputies to the legislative (representative) organs of the state power of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation exclusively by means of the proportional electoral system, because in that case we may encounter insurmountable difficulties in implementation of the passive electoral rights of citizens. The author identifies a positive trend towards widening regional discretion in choosing the ways of formation of state power authorities in the RF constituent entities. Also, she shows different approaches of the regional legislator to the legal regulation of the structure and competence of the legislative (representative) bodies. The paper notes the positive experience of passing regional laws with regard to Houses committees (commissions), thereby increasing the credibility of these bodies, stabilizing their status and strengthening parliamentary review. The paper also deals with some elements of the status of an MP and legal regulation of withdrawal of MPs. The author considers different theoretical approaches to notions of an imperative and free parliamentary mandates, especially the status of an MP elected within a party list. The author concludes that the existence of elements of an imperative mandate in regional legislation, unlike federal one, seems quite logical and does not violate the representative nature of the legislative bodies of the RF constituent entities.

Метою статті є аналіз механізмів взаємодії Президента Угорщини з органами державної влади, які закріплені в Конституції Угорщини та інших нормативно-правових документах.
 Наукова новизна. Особливий акцент зроблено на місці та ролі Президента в системі державної влади в аспекті конституційного визначення його повноважень та обов’язків.
 Висновки. Угорщина за формою правління є парламентською республікою, де Державні збори є повновладним органом, формують політично відповідальний перед ними Уряд й обирають Президента, який у системі державних органів є конституційним главою держави. Встановлено, що роль інституту президентства в організації державної влади в Республіці будується на закріпленні його статусу як арбітра, що врівноважує гілки державної влади. Це положення диктує місце Президента в системі державних органів, обсяг його повноважень, систему виборів, специфіку взаємин з іншими державними органами. Обґрунтовується, що Статус та обов’язки Президента Республіки майже не змінилися під час конституційного процесу. Норми Основного Закону Угорщини 2011 р., що регулюють інститут президентства, засновані на попередніх нормах Конституції 1949 р. Уряд і його діяльність не входять до сфери керівництва Президента. Главою виконавчої влади в Республіці є Прем’єр-міністр, який і здійснює урядову політику. Конституційним обов’язком Президента Угорщини є забезпечення балансу гілок влади. Саме ця діяльність, відповідно до Конституції, захищає демократичне функціонування державної організації. Якість функціювання Президента, як балансуючого чинника, пов’язана з його особистими якостями. За активної участі Президент має вплив на законотворчу діяльність, але тільки у сенсі запобіжника можливих, на його думку, порушень. У практичній площині законотворча діяльність регулюється рішеннями Конституційного Суду.

A particular feature of Kosovo’s internal policy development as an independent state and problematic reasons with a full international recognition of this fact is also highlighted. The research studied objective and subjective historical reasons for the state formation of Kosovo Albanians starting from the latent stage of this process within former Yugoslavia and then up to the declaration of Kosovo independence. Influence of Yugoslavia's collapse, as well as of external factors on Kosovo's separation from Serbia is also explored in this dissertation. A particular feature of Kosovo’s internal policy development as an independent state and problematic reasons with a full international recognition of this fact is also highlighted. Problem of Kosovo's status to the diplomacy of «power poles» in modern system of international relations within the context of NATO war against Yugoslavia in 1999 is underlined.The paper deals with EU policy on Kosovo Status. The author shows evolution of EU policy on Kosovo Status from diplomatic mission to «humanitarian intervention». These are the need for Kosovo independents. Another problem is to make a peace for Serbian-Kosovo relationship. Problem of Kosovo's status to the diplomacy of «power poles» in modern system of international relations within the context of NATO war against Yugoslavia in 1999 is underlined. A main tendency of Serbian policy towards Kosovo after the democratic transformation of political system of this state and in conditions of Serbia’s European integration aspirations was examined. NATO has been leading a peace support operation in Kosovo since Juni 1999 in support of wider international efforts to build peace and stability in the Balkan area. KFOR was established when NATO’s 78-day air campaign against Milosevic’s regime, aimed at putting to violence in Kosovo, was over. The operation derives its mandate from United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) and the Military – Technical Agreement between NATO, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia. KFOR’s original objectives were to deter renewed hostilities establish a secure environment and ensure public safety and order demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army, support the international humanitarian effort and coordinate with the international civil presence. KFOR continues contribute towards maintaining a safe and secure environment in Kosovo and freedom of movement for all. NATO strongly supports the Belgrad-Pristina EU-brokered Normalization Agreement. The author shows evolution of Balkans states policy on Kosovo Status from Dayton Agreements for Peace in Bosnia to independence of Kosovo. The Serb minority of Kosovo, which largely opposes the declaration of independence, has formed the Community Assembly of Kosovo in response. Problem of Kosovo's status to the diplomacy of “power poles” in modern system of international relations within the context of NATO war against Yugoslavia in 1999 is underlined. A main tendency of Serbian policy towards Kosovo after the democratic transformation of political system of this state and in conditions of Serbia’s European integration aspirations was examined.