Independence in Europe: Secession, Sovereignty, and the European Union

Abstract

III. THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A FORUM FOR SELF-DETERMINATION CLAIMS European integration was not always popular among nationalists in Europe's stateless nations. The SNP, for example, argued that integration amounted merely to the transfer of sovereignty over Scotland from one alien government in London to another in Brussels. (156) Yet by the 1980s, the SNP had become firm supporter of the European project and proponent of Independence in (157) Flemish nationalists have also embraced integration, and the N-VA describes itself as extremely pro-European party that supports both a stronger Flanders and stronger (158) The centrality of the EU to Catalan nationalist discourse is evident in the banners carried by demonstrators in Barcelona calling for Catalonia to become New European State, (159) in the Declaration of Sovereignty's assurance that [t]he founding principles of the European Union shall be defended and promoted, (160) and in Artur Mas's proposed wording for future referendum question: Do you want Catalonia to become new state within the European Union? (161) It is overly simplistic to conclude that the EU encourages or discourages separatism or that it makes secession easier or more difficult. Nonetheless, European integration affect[s] how the parties to [separatist] conflict perceive their own interests and identities. (162) Three aspects of the EU play particularly important role in shaping Flemish, Scottish, and Catalan self-determination claims and considering how such claims might be addressed: the respective roles of and regions in EU institutions, the rules governing EU membership, and the debates over the future of in the wake of the eurozone crisis. A. States and Regions Although it is often obscured by considerations of the EU's impact on sovereignty, the fact remains that the EU is in ways governed cooperation among the governments of its member states rather than by supranational structures with independent authority. (163) States remain the primary actors within the EU Membership in the EU is limited to sovereign that meet the EU's admissions criteria and that are admitted through unanimous vote by member states. (164) Once admitted to membership, participate directly in the EU's primary governing institutions: the European Council (consisting of ministers from each member state), the European Commission (consisting of one commissioner from each member state), and the European Parliament (consisting of elected representatives from the member states). (165) Thus, [statehood in the EU ... retains meaning for nationalists because it still remains the sole means by which nationalists can be recognized as sovereign equals in the European political system. (166) Attempts to establish formal channels for regional participation in EU governance have produced only limited results. During the 1980s and 1990s, it became popular to envision Europe of the in which local governments would replace as the primary building blocks of more fully integrated Europe. Many regions established information offices in Brussels in an effort to access the emerging European policymaking structures. (167) Bolstering the of the Regions idea was the Maastricht Treaty, which entered into force in 1993. (168) Maastricht enshrined the principle of subsidiarity (pursuant to which authority over any given area of competency should be vested at the lowest possible political level) in EU law, established Committee of the Regions, and allowed regional ministers to sit on member state delegations in the European Council where the member state deemed such participation appropriate. (169) Yet on balance, the robust regional role that the Maastricht Treaty appeared to promise has never fully materialized. According to Laible, many observers point not to the strength of regions in EU policymaking, but to their weakness. …