Incorrect compliance and correct noncompliance with information security policies: A framework of rule-related information security behaviour

Abstract

Information security policy (ISP) compliance is recognized as a key measure for dealing with human errors when protecting information. A considerable and growing body of literature has studied the persuasive, deterrent, and coercive antecedents of compliant and noncompliant behaviour. Simultaneously, research indicates that real life situations are too complex and varied to prescribe in terms of a priori rules of acceptable behaviour, and create situations where compliance is in fact harmful for achieving organisational security and business goals. Thus, regarding ISP compliance as inherently “correct” and noncompliance as inherently “incorrect”, may contribute to creating problems that compliance research seeks to alleviate. In this research perspective, we argue that ISP compliance and noncompliance cannot be universally and invariably determined as “correct” or “incorrect” but that they become meaningful only when evaluated against organisational outcomes. We draw on organisational accident theorists to develop our arguments and propose a framework of rule-related information security behaviour (RISB) in order to conceptualize different types of ISP compliant and noncompliant behaviour and their organisational outcomes. Our research argues that compliance and noncompliance are nor inherently correct or incorrect and that making the judgement on the correctness of these actions requires considering the rule, the action, and the outcome.