Inconsistent voting behaviour in the FOMC

Abstract

ABSTRACTThis article uses transcript data to examine determinants of inconsistent voting behaviour in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) in the period 1989–2008. Inconsistent voting behaviour occurs if a member shows disagreement on the interest rate proposed by the chairman in the policy go-around, but this member agrees in the formal vote. Results show that after the 1993’s increase in central bank transparency, the probability of casting inconsistent votes decreases significantly, on average by 3.3 percentage points. FOMC members with longer tenure on the committee have a lower probability of casting inconsistent votes. Further results suggest that board members and bank presidents differ significantly, with bank presidents casting inconsistent votes more often than board members do. This relation holds true for gender as well, with female members casting more inconsistent votes than males. In addition, political aspects and career backgrounds also contribute to explaining inconsistent voting behaviour in the FOMC. Conditional effects reveal that after the change in transparency, differences between board members and bank presidents remain, whereas differences between male and female members have diminished. What is more, FOMC members with a career in the government sector have been strongly affected by the regime shift in transparency.