Incommensurability and Basic Goods: A Tension in the New Natural Law Theory

Abstract

In the ‘new natural law theory,’ the idea of basic goods plays a pivotal role.l Because, together, they comprise the elements of ‘integral human flourishing,’ the basic goods maintain continuity with the Aristotelianism that Aquinas bequeathed to the natural law tradition.2 Because their status as goods, on this view, is self-evident (per se nota), they provide this new natural law theory with a firm foundation for ethics while enabling it to skirt old worries about deriving an ‘ought’ from an ‘is.’3 Because the basic goods are mutually incommensurable, they leave intelligible room for practical reasoning to operate ‘creatively’ in shaping an individual’s practical concerns.4 And because even their instances are incommensurable with one another, they allow this view to be ‘good-based’ in an obvious sense without compromising the Pauline Principle — the precept that evil is not to be done that good may come of it.5 The basic goods thus position the new natural law theory to provide an attractive and well-founded view that frames morality within a broader conception of human flourishing, leaving appropriate room for individuality while preserving strict moral principles.