Abstract

PurposeThis study aims to examine the impact of income smoothing on the value of firms in a regulated security market, moderated by market risk. This is based on the prevalence of accounting scandals resulting in the collapse of firms which has been attributed to the opportunistic behaviors of managers.Design/methodology/approachThe ex post facto research design was employed, and as such, data were gathered from secondary sources. The quantitative approach was also used in the study. Furthermore, the system generalized method of moments (Blundell–Bond) panel estimation technique was used for analyzing the data. Income smoothing was measured using the accrual based methods, while firm value was measured using share price.FindingsThe study found that income smoothing has a negative significant impact on firm value. The study also revealed that market risk is a significant variable that defines the relationship between income smoothing and firm value.Originality/valueTesting the moderating effect of market risk on the relationship between income smoothing and firm value is unique to this study, particularly from a regulated security market and emerging economy.

Highlights

  • The industrial revolution which started in Britain from the 18th to 19th heralded the period of public ownership of firms (Kitson and Michie, 2014)

  • 4.1 Summary statistics Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the firm value ratio (Share price), income smoothing (IS), market risk (MR), and firm characteristics which serve as control variables for the study, profitability (PROF), firm size (SIZE), and leverage (LEV) of non-financial firms on the Nigerian Stock Exchange

  • The study examined the influence of income smoothing and market risk on the value of Nigerian listed firms

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Summary

Introduction

The industrial revolution which started in Britain from the 18th to 19th heralded the period of public ownership of firms (Kitson and Michie, 2014). The principal–agent relationship is defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as “a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some services on their behalf which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent”. The efficiency of this relationship is mostly affected by the individuals and opportunistic interests held by each party. The owners expect the agents to act in their interest, but the interests of the principals and the agents are not always aligned (Panda and Leepsa, 2017)

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