Abstract
Do legislators represent the rich better than they represent the poor? Recent work provides mixed support for this proposition. I test the hypothesis of differential representation using a data set on the political preferences of 318,537 individuals. Evidence of differential representation in the House of Representatives is weak. Support for differential representation is stronger in the Senate. In recent years, representation has occurred primarily through the selection of a legislator from the appropriate party. Although the preferences of higher-income constituents account for more of the variation in legislator voting behavior, higher-income constituents also account for much more of the variation in district preferences. In light of the low level of overall responsiveness, differential responsiveness appears small.
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