Abstract
Philosophers have shown that the Aristotelian conception of mind and body (monism) is capable of resolving the problems confronting dualism. In this paper the resolution of the mind–body problem is extended with a scientific solution by integrating the (neo) Aristotelian framework with evolutionary theory. It is discussed how the theories of Fisher and Hamilton (two extensions of Darwin’s theory) enable us to construct and solve hypotheses about how the mind evolved out of matter. These hypotheses are illustrated by two examples: the evolutionary transition from cells to multicellular organisms (with internal and external organs), and the evolutionary transition from babbling to doing things with words and later reasoning and giving reasons. The first transitions resulted in the sensitive psyche of the other animals, the second in the rational psyche of humans. It is discussed how exploratory behaviour of lower-level entities facilitated these evolutionary transitions.
Highlights
The mind–body problem is a philosophical problem
I have discussed how we can extend the resolution of the mind–body problem of philosophers with its solution, by showing how we can integrate neo-Aristotelian monism with modern evolutionary theory so that we are able to construct and solve empirical problems
We can discern several evolutionary transitions which we can study if we pay attention to how lower-level exploratory behaviour of entities facilitated the evolution of higher level structures that obtained new functions
Summary
It has been resolved as the result of investigations of Hacker, Kenny, Ryle, Wittgenstein and others They have shown that elaborations of Aristotle’s conception of the mind and body (monism) are capable of answering the questions confronting Plato’s, Augustine’s and Descartes’ dualism. What I shall discuss instead is how we can reconcile the resolution of the mind–body problem [what Hacker (2007) has called the neo-Aristotelian conception of mind and body] with scientific insights. For this enables us to see how the ideas of Fisher and Hamilton clarify a conceptual observation made by Wittgenstein and others, namely that we attribute mental predicates to the whole, behaving organism, not to its parts This was later called by Hacker a mereological principle. In a Kuhnian terminology: the new conceptual framework enables us to construct and solve ‘puzzles’
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