Incentives in a public addiction treatment system: Effects on waiting time and selection

Abstract

Program-level financial incentives are used by some payers as a tool to improve quality of substance use treatment. However, evidence of effectiveness is mixed and performance contracts may have unintended consequences such as creating barriers for more challenging clients who are less likely to meet benchmarks. This study investigates the impact of a performance contract on waiting time for substance use treatment and client selection. Admission and discharge data from publicly funded Maine outpatient (OP) and intensive outpatient (IOP) substance use treatment programs (N = 38,932 clients) were used. In a quasi-experimental pre-post design, pre-period (FY 2005–2007) admission data from incentivized (IC) and non-incentivized (non-IC) programs were compared to post-period (FY 2008–2012) using propensity score matching and multivariate difference-in-difference regression. Dependent variables were waiting time (incentivized) and client selection (severity: history of mental disorders and substance use severity, not incentivized). Despite financial incentives designed to reduce waiting time for substance use treatment among state-funded outpatient programs, average waiting time for treatment increased in the post period for both IC and non-IC groups, as did client severity. There were no significant differences in waiting time between IC and non-IC groups over time. Increases in client severity over time, with no group differences, indicate that programs did not restrict access for more challenging clients. Adequate funding and other approaches to improve quality may be beneficial.