Abstract
Encouraging enterprises to adopt green and low-carbon technological innovation is an important measure to cope with climate change and achieve low-carbon economic development. As the main stakeholders of green and low-carbon technological innovation of enterprises, what measures should the government and the public take to encourage green and low-carbon technological innovation of enterprises has become one of the focuses of research. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model among the government, the public, and enterprises and then obtains the evolutionary stability strategy by analyzing the replication dynamic equation of each subject. Numerical simulation is made on the evolution path of the game under different enforcement intensities of environmental regulation means. The result shows that pollution tax, low-carbon technology innovation subsidy, and environmental protection publicity and guidance are three environmental regulation means to effectively stimulate enterprises’ green and low-carbon technology innovation. And moderate pollution tax, low-intensity publicity of public environmental protection, and high innovation incentive compensation have the highest incentive efficiency for enterprises’ green and low-carbon technological innovation. Targeted suggestions for promoting green and low-carbon technological innovation of enterprises are put forward in the end.
Highlights
The environmental impact caused by the excessive exploitation and utilization of energy, such as climate change, has posed a great challenge to the survival and development of human beings (Gaffney and Steffen, 2017; Tian et al, 2019)
This study aims to explore how to get rid of traditional non-environmental protection technologies and encourage enterprises to carry out green and low-carbon technological innovation under the participation of the public and the environmental regulation of the government
When CL + CI < ΔR3, Cs < I, there is at least one equilibrium point E3(0, 1, 1) in the system, that is, when the government and the public, respectively, adopt no regulation and supervision strategy, enterprises can be effectively mobilized to conduct low-carbon technological innovation in the case that the benefits of conducting green and low-carbon technological innovation are greater than the sum of its possible costs, as can be seen from the stability condition of E6(1, 0, 0)and E7(1, 1, 0); when enterprises are faced with constraint conditions ΔR2 − CI +
Summary
The environmental impact caused by the excessive exploitation and utilization of energy, such as climate change, has posed a great challenge to the survival and development of human beings (Gaffney and Steffen, 2017; Tian et al, 2019). In the context of low-carbon economy and sustainable development, it is of great significance to explore how government incentives and punishment policies and the public’s consumer supervision behavior affect enterprises’ lowcarbon technological innovation, forming a benign interaction between the government, the public, and enterprises to stimulate enterprises’ innovation behavior. The marginal contribution of this study is as follows: 1) establish a game model with the government, the public (consumers), and enterprises as the three participants, and study the strategic choices of the three stakeholders; 2) find out the equilibrium point by solving the replicator dynamics equation and analyze its asymptotic stability; and 3) the evolutionary game model is simulated by a MATLAB numerical simulation analysis tool so as to find the path to encourage enterprises to choose the green and low-carbon innovation mode.
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