Abstract
As payment for environmental services (PES) initiatives spread to collectively managed natural resources, questions arise because the incentive structures that might be appropriate for individually managed resources will not necessarily promote the collective action required to manage the commons. Theory suggests challenges for cash payments to promote collective action, and for alternative payment types to facilitate conditionality. Possible ways to reconcile this disconnect involve conceiving of PES more broadly through the use of multiple forms of payment including non-cash incentives and placing greater focus on building institutions for collective action than on strict conditionality.
Highlights
Payment for environmental services (PES) refers to direct payments to land managers in exchange for managing their land in a way that produces environmental services of interest to the payer
As payment for environmental services (PES) initiatives spread to collectively managed natural resources, questions arise because the incentive structures that might be appropriate for individually managed resources will not necessarily promote the collective action required to manage the commons
New questions arise as PES spreads to commons contexts and collective action becomes a prerequisite for successful conservation
Summary
Payment for environmental services (PES) refers to direct payments to land managers in exchange for managing their land in a way that produces environmental services of interest to the payer. Frey (1999), Vatn (2010), and Van Hecken and Bastiaensen (2010) all raised pertinent questions about motivational aspects of conservation payments but these studies devoted little if any attention to the implications of incentive payments for the collective action needed to secure conservation Heyman and Ariely 2004) suggests that nonmonetary incentives could perhaps have better properties for promoting collective action, but as will be discussed below, they would face greater challenges in enforcing the conditionality that is the key feature of PES Given this potential tradeoff, this paper analyzes the potential implications of different payment types for conditionality, collective action, and non-financial sources of motivation to act collectively to manage natural resources. The main argument resulting from this synthesis is that in facing the potential tradeoff a PES initiative may face between stronger conditionality and stronger potential for institutionbuilding to manage the commons, a focus on institution-building is likely to be a better bet
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