Abstract
ABSTRACT We use electoral system change in Russia to identify the means by which a proportional representation (PR) system yields strategic electoral behavior that favors the ruling party in an authoritarian regime. Specifically, we argue that Russian regions enjoying greater representation via the ruling party in Russia’s first PR-only elections relative to the previously mixed electoral system should have been more likely to deliver votes in that party’s direction in the second PR-only election as a way to maximize their representation under the new rules. Using robust regression analysis, we demonstrate that regional experiences under the first PR-only election did influence the supply of votes to the ruling party and that this outcome holds when controlling for other explanations of vote delivery. With this finding in hand, we take a closer look at the representation of Russia’s regions over time to demonstrate how electoral system effects in authoritarian states are not simply the product of regime trajectory.
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