Abstract
For a two-echelon supply chain consisted of one manufacturer and one supplier, the incentive mechanism is designed for the supplier to reduce the production cost of green intermediate products by the manufacturer. It is proposed under the situation of asymmetric information on the endeavor level of supplier to promote the initiative of suppliers technology R&D. The design process of the incentive mechanism in the face of moral hazard problems is discussed by the manufacturer. It indicates that the manufacturer can adopt linear incentive payment according to different periods of producing and marketing. The results manifest that the proposed incentive mechanism will promote the supplier's efforts on R&D as far as possible and make the profits of the members Pareto improvement distinctly. The paper affords great guidance on operating decisions for the green supply chain at initial stages of the green market.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.