Incentive Mechanism for Cooperative Intrusion Response: A Dynamic Game Approach

Abstract

Multi-hop D2D (Device-to-Device) communication is often exposed to many intrusions for its inherent properties, such as openness and weak security protection. To mitigate the intrusions in time, one of significant approaches is to establish a Cooperative Intrusion Response System (CIRS) to respond to intrusion activities during data transmission. In CIRS, user equipments that act as relays (RUEs) are assumed to actively help destination nodes to respond to intrusion activities. However, this assumption is often invalid in multi-hop D2D communication because the RUEs are selfish and unwilling to spend extra resources on undertaking response tasks. To address this problem, a game approach is proposed to encourage RUEs to cooperate. In detail, we formulate an incentive mechanism for CIRS in multi-hop D2D communication as a dynamic game and achieve an optimal solution to help RUEs decide whether to participate in detection or not. Theoretical analysis shows that only one Nash equilibrium exists for the proposed game. Simulations demonstrate that our mechanism can efficiently motivate potential RUEs to participate in intrusion detection and response, and it can also block intrusion propagation in time.