Incentive Mechanism Design for Emergency Frequency Control in Multi-Infeed Hybrid AC-DC System

Abstract

In multi-infeed hybrid AC-DC (MIDC) systems, the emergency frequency control (EFC) with LCC-HVDC systems participating is of vital importance for system frequency security. Nevertheless, when regional power systems are operated by different decision-makers, the LCC-HVDC systems and their connected AC systems might be unwilling to participate in the EFC due to the costs and losses. In this paper, to incentivize the LCC-HVDC systems and their connected adjacent AC systems to participate in the droop-based EFC, a novel control-parameter-based incentive mechanism is proposed, which can flexibly deal with various possible power imbalances. Then, a non-cooperative-based incentive game model is formulated to quantitatively analyze the incentive mechanism in the MIDC system. An algorithm for seeking the Nash equilibrium is designed, and the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium is proven. Moreover, the individual rationality, incentive compatibility and social optimality of the proposed mechanism are analyzed and proven. The effectiveness of the proposed incentive mechanism is verified through a case study.