Incentive Mechanism Design for Computation Offloading in Heterogeneous Fog Computing: A Contract-Based Approach

Abstract

Fog computing is a promising solution for new emerging applications requiring intensive computation resources and low latency. Devices at the edge of network can share idle resources and collaboratively accomplish the computing tasks in fog computing. Thus, task publishers have heterogeneous options when offloading computing tasks considering the quality of transmission links, energy consumption and other hardware constraints of fog nodes. To incentivize these devices to participate in computation offloading, effective incentive mechanisms are needed. In this paper, utilizing the framework of contract theory, we formulate the negotiation between task ublisher and fog nodes as an optimization problem. The optimal contract is the Nash equilibrium solution achieved by task publisher and fog nodes. Simulation results show that an optimal contract can maximize the utility of task publisher meanwhile guarantee the individual rationality and incentive compatibility of fog nodes. Therefore, edge devices can be incentivized effectively to involve in the computation offloading.