Abstract
This paper uses a simple make-or-buy model to summarize and illustrate some of the distinguishing aspects of Williamson's transaction cost theory. It is shown that each mode of governance is associated with a different degree of incentive intensity, which in turn is attributable to the difference in court access and in the control of accounts. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.
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