Abstract
This paper designs an incentive strategy for a class of stochastic Stackelberg games in finite horizon and infinite horizon, respectively. The obtained incentive Stackelberg strategy works well in the sense that the leader will get his desired solution in the end. Different from the existing works, the state-dependent noise is considered in the design of the incentive Stackelberg strategy. Moreover, the mean-square stabilization can be guaranteed by the follower. The algorithm procedure is put forward to obtain effectively the incentive feedback Stackelberg strategy in infinite horizon. Finally, two examples are given to shed light on the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm procedure.
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