Abstract

 
 
 We consider the problem of detecting norm violations in open multi-agent systems (MAS). We show how, using ideas from scrip systems, we can design mechanisms where the agents comprising the MAS are incentivised to monitor the actions of other agents for norm violations. The cost of providing the incentives is not borne by the MAS and does not come from fines charged for norm violations (fines may be impossible to levy in a system where agents are free to leave and rejoin again under a different identity). Instead, monitoring incentives come from (scrip) fees for accessing the services provided by the MAS. In some cases, perfect monitoring (and hence enforcement) can be achieved: no norms will be violated in equilibrium. In other cases, we show that, while it is impossible to achieve perfect enforcement, we can get arbitrarily close; we can make the probability of a norm violation in equilibrium arbitrarily small. We show using simulations that our theoretical results, which apply to systems with a large number of agents, hold for multi-agent systems with as few as 1000 agents–the system rapidly converges to the steady-state distribution of scrip tokens necessary to ensure monitoring and then remains close to the steady state.
 
 
Highlights
Norms have been widely proposed as a means of coordinating and controlling the behaviour of agents in a multi-agent system (MAS)
We propose an approach to norm monitoring in open multi-agents systems in which the monitoring of agent actions is performed by the agents comprising the MAS
It is clear that in this setting, free riding is possible: an agent may never volunteer and at the same time gain utility when chosen to make the request. (This relies on some altruistic agents volunteering; otherwise, nobody gains any utility since there are no volunteers to satisfy any requests.) The solution proposed by KFH to reduce free riding uses techniques from scrip systems
Summary
Norms have been widely proposed as a means of coordinating and controlling the behaviour of agents in a multi-agent system (MAS). We propose an approach to norm monitoring in open multi-agents systems in which the monitoring of agent actions is performed by the agents comprising the MAS. The novelty of our approach is that the MAS does not need to bear the cost of paying for monitoring; at the same time we do not need to assume that fines can be levied on the agents who violate the norms and used to pay for monitoring, as done by Fagundes et al (2014) The latter assumption does not hold for many open systems where the agents can always leave the system and, if needed, rejoin it later under a different identity. We show that the system rapidly converges to the steady-state distribution of scrip tokens necessary to ensure monitoring and remains close to the steady state
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