Abstract
This work was motivated by a problem regarding a group of public utilities located in relatively close proximity to each other. Some of these utilities are confronted by a shortage of capacity while others have excess capacity. The buyers cooperate to purchase in the most efficient way the quantities they need (which are private information). The total joint cost is then allocated by an incentive compatible rule (i.e., a rule which induces the buyers to reveal their true demands). We show that for a large class of problems there are cost-allocation schemes which are incentive compatible and yield individually rational and efficient outcomes. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C72, D61, D82, L94.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
