Abstract
Cerebral energy supply is insufficient to support continuous neuronal processing of the plethora of time-constant objects that we are aware of. As a result, the brain is forced to limit processing resources to (the most relevant) cases of change. The neuronally generated world is thus temporally discontinuous. This parallels the fact that, in all relevant microscopic fundamental equations of nature, temporal change plays a dominant role. When a scientist calculates a “solution” to such an equation, integration over time is an essential step. The present Hypothesis expresses that the step from neuronal activity to phenomenal content of consciousness is reflective of a (phenomenal) “solution:” the main source of the incomprehensibility of consciousness is proposed to result from the introduction of phenomenal time-constant entities. These are “filled-in” via integration, even though neuronal data only exists for changes to these entities. In this way, a temporally continuous picture of the world phenomenally appears. Qualia are “initial conditions,” which are required for integration and cannot be deduced from present data. Phenomenal “identity” (vs. “high similarity”) is related to qualia. Inattentive visual perception, which is only rarely investigated, offers insights into these relationships. Introspectively, unattended vision appears rich because percepts are cumulated over long time spans, whereas attentive perception relies purely on present neuronal signals. The present Hypothesis is that a brief neuronal activity can signify long-lasting and constant phenomenal content of consciousness. Experimental support is presented that comes from discrepancies between neuronal activity and perception: transient neuronal responses to sustained stimuli, “filling-in,” change blindness, identity vs. close resemblance.
Highlights
The present communication is concerned with Chalmers’ “Hard Problem” of consciousness (1995, 2018): essentially, “why and how do physical processes in the brain give rise to conscious experience?” or, expressed otherwise: “an organism is conscious if there is something that means what it is like to be that organism and a mental state is conscious if there is something that means what it is like to be in that state.” To solve the hard problem, one must unite neuronal processing, which obeys the principles of natural science, with reported or subjectively felt content of consciousness
This lies in strong contrast to the phenomenal level of consciousness: the remarkable feature is that brief signals can generate significances that are experienced as identical percepts for long time spans
When perception over extended time spans is taken into consideration, a succession of neuronal activity is assumed to occur in parallel (Melloni, 2015)
Summary
The present communication is concerned with Chalmers’ “Hard Problem” of consciousness (1995, 2018): essentially, “why and how do physical processes in the brain give rise to conscious experience?” or, expressed otherwise: “an organism is conscious if there is something that means what it is like to be that organism and a mental state is conscious if there is something that means what it is like to be in that state.” To solve the hard problem, one must unite neuronal processing, which obeys the principles of natural science, with reported or subjectively felt content of consciousness. The results are “known” immediately after the last change and they remain valid until the change occurs This description comes very close to that of consciousness: at the instant of an intensity change from zero to 304 units, visual neurones react briefly and the percept “light is on at 304 units” begins. In nature, there is no “identity.” There is no need for exact replication, neither in terms of behavioural action nor neuronal activity This lies in strong contrast to the phenomenal level of consciousness: the remarkable feature is that brief signals can generate significances that are experienced as identical percepts for long time spans. As such, they appear phenomenally in the outer world. This will not be elaborated in the present framework
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