In what sense should we talk about the perception of other minds?

Abstract

By means of spontaneous and unconscious imitation, an observer may be able to directly experience the inner states of another person because the observer and the observed share similar neural pathways. This discovery of a common neural basis reveals the correlative mechanisms through which the intentions of others are perceived. While analysing the implications of this discovery, this paper notes that the correlation does not provide a complete explanation of our understanding of other minds. Instead, the correlation comes into play only to a minimal degree. The paper also explores the epistemological characteristic of the knowledge harboured by other minds. That is, as a kind of private knowledge, the experience of other minds can help us arrive at a relatively consistent understanding of others and engage in communication with them through public expression and the description of mental states. However, it is impossible to truly understand other minds because conscious experience in the strict sense resides only in its owner, and the unique qualia emerging inside the subject cannot be directly observed from a third-person perspective. In this sense, the so-called perception of other minds is not suited to seeking a causal explanation of the ways in which others act, but for reading the meanings expressed by them in a given situation.