In the Wake of the Islamic State Threat: Repercussions on Sunni-Shiʿi Competition in Lebanon

Abstract

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, appointed caliph of the ‘Islamic State’ proclaimed in 2014 over territories in Iraq and Syria, did not hide the expansionist aims of his organization, Daʿesh (also known as ISIS), in the Levant. Going beyond the alarmist excesses of some analyses, the menace of radical Islam for Lebanese sovereignty in particular sounds credible. Daʿesh has more than one reason to be interested in Lebanon and to achieve a breakthrough there, even if only a partial one. Moreover, its infiltration would seem to be facilitated by the presence of 1.2 million Syrian refugees as much as by the infatuation with the cause of the Islamic State by certain components of the Lebanese Sunni community. But what are the real risks of a successful invasion by the Islamic State’s fighters? And, most importantly, what resources can Lebanon bring to bear in order to prevent it? Faced with these undeniable sources of destabilization, two armed forces can take to the field: the Lebanese army and Hezbollah. But neither can pursue any sort of protection of the borders and national territory successfully without both political will on the part of Lebanon’s ruling parties and international assistance and cooperation on several levels.