In the Shadow of the “Asian Balkans”: Anti-Chinese Alarmism and Hostility in the Russian Far East

Abstract

One day we will wake up and half the population here will be slit-eyed. … A Vladivostok cab driver talking with the author, May 1999 If you do not take practical steps to advance the Far East soon, after a few decades, the Russian population will be speaking Japanese, Chinese, and Korean. Vladimir Putin, Russian president, speaking to residents of Blagoveshchensk, a city bordering China across the Amur River, July 2000 On August 14, 2002, a striking front-page photomontage greeted the readers of Russia's mainstream daily newspaper, Gazeta. It showed the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, wearing a benevolent, mellow smile and a Chairman Mao–style blue uniform. The optimism-exuding president, accompanied by his prime minister, was holding a tense, frightened baby on his knees. The child looked distinctly Asian, presumably Chinese. This was not an April Fools' Day joke, a last-minute manipulation by a hacker, or an editorial prank. This was an illustration of a serious front-page story in a serious, politically well-connected Russian newspaper. The story was titled: “Every Other Person in Russia Will Be a Huatsiao [Chinese migrant].” It presented a detailed summary of expert assessments commissioned by Russia's upper house of parliament, the Federation Council. The study concluded that by 2050 the Chinese would become Russia's second largest ethnic group. I used the opening quotations and the description of the Putin photomontage to introduce the argument that Chinese migration into the Russian Far East after the collapse of the Soviet Union is a critical case study of immigration phobia and the security dilemma.