Abstract

Abstract The ICJ has asserted that the prohibition of genocide generates both obligations erga omnes and obligations erga omnes partes. While it has recently referred to the question of standing and the erga omnes partes character of the obligations under the Genocide Convention in The Gambia v. Myanmar case, the Court has not yet addressed this question from the perspective of the prohibition of genocide as an obligation erga omnes in a broader context. Hence, the purpose of this article is to examine whether the erga omnes character of the prohibition of genocide under general international law confers upon States a right of standing to invoke State responsibility before the Court, provided that certain conditions are met. Three instances are envisaged through which this could be possible, but for the time being, The Gambia v. Myanmar case remains the most representative one in this matter.

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