Abstract
This paper will analyse Lucas Alaman’s proposals for the reform of the 1824 Mexican Constitution in the 1830s. It will argue that, contrary to the interpretations of many historians, during these years he did not advocate the adoption of a centralist system, or the abolition of representative government. Instead, it will show that Alaman’s real interest lay in promoting radical changes in the distribution of power between the three branches of government. Through a close examination of his ideas, it will suggest that Alaman did not favour the adoption of the US checks and balances system, nor the division of powers established in the 1812 Spanish Constitution. Rather, Alaman wished to see Mexico adopt a version of the British balanced constitution. Submission date: 25/01/2007 Acceptance date: 17/04/2007
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