Abstract
I propose that artworks represent a specific and homogeneous ontological kind, grounded in a common ontological core. I call this common core ‘non-universalizable embodied meaning’, and I argue that (a) this common core explains how artworks unfold their ontological identity at the physical, intentional, and social levels on the basis of an original and irreducible mode of material embodiment and cultural emergence; (b) this common core functions as the constitutive rule of art (conceived as a social kind) and institutes an axiological normativity, that is, normativity based on aesthetic value; (c) it has a central role both in the theoretical definition of art and in the identification, recognition, and fruition of the individual artworks; (d) it enables artistic creativity, historical transformations of art, and the current, multifaceted state of art.
Highlights
ARTWORK AS AN INTENTIONAL DEVICEArtworks constitute representational devices that convey meanings
I propose that artworks represent a specific and homogeneous ontological kind, grounded in a common ontological core
I call this common core ‘non-universalizable embodied meaning’, and I argue that (a) this common core explains how artworks unfold their ontological identity at the physical, intentional, and social levels on the basis of an original and irreducible mode of material embodiment and cultural emergence; (b) this common core functions as the constitutive rule of art and institutes an axiological normativity, that is, normativity based on aesthetic value; (c) it has a central role both in the theoretical definition of art and in the identification, recognition, and fruition of the individual artworks; (d) it enables artistic creativity, historical transformations of art, and the current, multifaceted state of art
Summary
Artworks constitute representational devices that convey meanings. Artworks are designed to prompt, to prescribe, and to guide open imaginative games of make-believe, repeated cycles of perception and conceptualization, interpretative processes that are terminable only in virtue of pragmatic stipulations that do not deplete the available affordances for further elaboration, and corresponding experiences of endogenous pleasure, autotelic appreciation, and self-contained satisfaction – that is, self-reinforced and self-rewarding experiences that do not go beyond themselves towards an external and practical goal, but are supported by the processing dynamics determined by the nonuniversalizable embodied meaning.[32] As I have argued, whatever the procedures of presenting artworks (or whatever the material changes undergone in the process of restoration, or the technical innovation concerning art), non-universalizable embodied meaning is a requirement that candidate entities must satisfy, at least minimally, in order to be assigned the status of art. Non-universalizable embodied meaning provides an essential hermeneutical tool for coping with and trying to limit the market forces that have, for example, since the famous chimpanzee Congo that was instructed by Morris in the 1950s, created an entire submarket dedicated to animal art, with ‘artworks’ made by dogs, elephants, dolphins, and horses.[37]
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
