In search of the elusive Chinese urban middle class: an exploratory analysis

Social class and body weight among Chinese urban adults: The role of the middle classes in the nutrition transition

In recent years, more and more attention has been focused on the effects of economic growth and inequality changes on income polarization, as well as on the changes in the middle income class fraction. A significant part of the literature that deals with these issues is focused on polarization indices. However, the polarization indices proposed by researchers do not allow for an assessment of impact of the income distribution changes on the disappearance of the middle income class. Moreover, the general income polarization indices do not allow for assessment of polarization within the distinguished income classes. This study proposes a class of median relative polarization partial indices, which allows for a comprehensive assessment of the median relative polarization over time, within the distinguished income classes, as well as the impact of income distribution changes (its polarization or convergence) on the change of the middle income class fraction (its disappearance or increase). Using Social Diagnosis panel data (a study carried out by the Social Monitoring Council), the proposed new tool has been used to verify the hypothesis of whether changes in the household income distribution in Poland during the years 2005–2015 have led to income polarization within the three distinguished income groups—lower, middle and upper income classes. Empirical analysis shows that despite the lack of overall polarization of incomes in the household population, there was a convergence of incomes in the upper and lower income classes and polarization of incomes within the middle income class. It implies that the income distribution has not been petrified, and as on average individuals in the lower and upper income classes tend to reduce the distance to the median income, whereas the members of the middle income class tend to be pushed out of the middle class. Moreover, the flows of households into the middle income class were higher than the outflows from this class, resulting in economic convergence, i.e. changes in income distribution leading to an increase of the middle income class fraction.

This study presents the main facts related to the development of income inequalities in OECD countries in recent years. In particular, the focus was on analysing the economic position of the middle class (middle income class), which is often neglected in analyses, in favour of the two extreme income groups, i.e. the poverty sphere and the group of the richest. It is worth filling this gap because the middle class is the backbone of modern society and decisively determines the possibilities of economic development. The analysis of the coefficients allowing the estimation of the size and affluence of the middle class indicates that this class is highly diversified among OECD countries. In countries such as: Slovakia, Slovenia, Norway, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Denmark, Hungary, Finland, Belgium, Sweden and Austria, there is a relatively large and affluent middle class. In contrast, in Anglo-Saxon countries, the middle class is relatively small and moderately affluent. The article empirically confirms the hypothesis that higher income inequalities are accompanied by middle-class erosion. Using the basic income ratio, in the form of the Gini coefficient for disposable income, a very strong negative correlation was identified both between this coefficient and the coefficient determining the size of the middle class (-0.91) and between the Gini coefficient and the coefficient determining the affluence of the middle class (-0, 84). Attention is paid to possible causes of the occurrence of the phenomenon of economic polarization. Proposals for solutions in the field of socio-economic policy aimed at limiting the scale of observed phenomena were also presented.

Crime, Inequality, and the Private Provision of Security

Poverty vulnerability has been particularly recognized in the wake of the impact of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) that is likely to yield declines in incomes because of reduced economic activities. In this study, an updated profile of the poor in the Philippines, as well as various segments of the income distribution, based on the 2018 Family Income and Expenditure Survey is provided. The study also follows the typology of the low-, middle-, and high-income classes proposed in previous research reports and simulate the likely effects of contractions in per capita income on poverty and the entire income distribution amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Due to the unavailability of required data to estimate the impact of COVID-19 on poverty and income distribution, simulation scenarios and assumptions were used. The study finds that in a medium case scenario of declines of incomes by 10 percent across the entire income distribution, the number of poor Filipinos can increase by 5.5 million, but with the emergency financial subsidies (i.e., the social amelioration program and the small business wage subsidy in. place) that targeted 90 percent of households, the worsening of poverty conditions has been managed so that only 1.5 million would fall into poverty, i.e., 4 million less than expected number of Filipinos falling into poverty. Further, low-income classes would, on average, transition only a quarter year more than the baseline of 21.25 years for this medium-case scenario if, after the pandemic (and an assumed V-shaped economic recovery), their incomes would have a constant annual growth of 2.5 percent. However, under tougher conditions of income contractions of 20 percent, simulation shows that the average time for low income Filipinos to move up into middle income class would increase by three years from baseline figures. This is assuming that social protection cash assistance is also provided. These results, though relying on simulation scenarios and simplistic assumptions, illustrates the importance of providing social protection not only for the poor but also for segments of the income distribution that could likely to fall into poverty due to reduced economic activities during this COVID-19 pandemic. Among others, the study urged the Philippine Statistics Authority to start reviewing its official poverty measurement system, including the current use of income over expenditure as the poverty metric, as well as its poverty line setting methodology given the changes in income and expenditure patterns in the past decade (prior to the onset of COVID-19) that improved living conditions.

It is sometimes difficult to tell which group is more distressed about the purportedly deteriorating well-being of Canada’s middle class: Politicians courting middle-class voters, or the Canadians who actually identify as middle class. Even more difficult to discern is whether either group truly understands precisely who it is they are worrying about. There is no firm consensus on where the upper and lower boundaries of the middle class lie, with economists and statisticians disagreeing on the income levels and brackets that should be included in the definition of middle class, and some even arguing that income itself may be an inappropriate measure (preferring instead, for instance, consumption and lifestyle). And yet, despite all the conflicting approaches to measuring the middle class, what emerges from a review of the array of definitions and data sources is that the politicians and voters can at least partly justify their angst. While the middle class has seen its income grow, it has not kept pace with the income growth rate of higherearning groups. But not all members of the so-called middle class face the same plight. The workers who have lost the most ground relative to higher-income groups, are those with below-average human capital (that is, lower skill and education), and are at the lower end of the middle-income bracket. The largest source of downward pressure on middle-class incomes has been the decline of Canada’s manufacturing industry. Beginning in the postwar years, factory jobs developed a misplaced reputation for being well-paying middleclass work. In fact, the work provided generous pay and benefits only relative to the low human capital that was necessary to find employment in manufacturing. As manufacturing has declined across all industrialized countries, lower-skilled workers have been forced to accept lower rates of income growth. Meanwhile, more gains have been made by those with high levels of human capital. Public-sector professionals in particular have come to share the human-capital and income characteristics of Canada’s highest-paid managers and professionals, often enjoying greater job security as well. In reality, anxiety over the state of the middle class and its future is actually about the working class. Lumping middle-class factory workers and clerical assistants in with middle-class teachers and nurses — as current political discussion tends to do — obscures the truth about which members of that group are genuinely struggling to keep up. As long as politicians continue to promote policies aimed at helping everyone within such a vague and broad target group, they can only end up misdirecting resources by enriching those who are already doing reasonably well, rather than focusing on those working-class Canadians who truly are not. Already net transfers through the tax system to middle-income groups have grown markedly. These transfers have managed to offset about half the erosion of middle-class incomes in the marketplace. Those transfers have been financed through increased tax payments from high-income groups, but also through shrinking transfers to low-income groups. These developments raise serious policy issues for which there are no simple answers. The breadth of Canada’s middle class obviously means that it encompasses the largest proportion of families, by far. Any further policies aimed at transferring wealth from other income groups to appease middle-class voters will be costly. Given that the main cause for concern is the worsening situation of lowerskilled workers, politicians who truly want to help those struggling in the “middle class,” should focus their efforts on helping Canadians acquire more education and more skills.

Introduction By the time the World Bank started to classify countries by per capita incomes into low, middle and high income countries in the 1980s, Malaysia was already a middle income country. The World Bank used Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of US$1,006–3,975 and US$3,976–12,275 in 2010 to classify countries into lower and upper middle incomes, respectively (World Bank 2011 a ). Based on the 1985 World Bank classification, Malaysia was already a middle income country with a per capita income of US$2,161 (US$2,027 in current prices) (World Bank 2011 b ). With a per capita income of US$5,264 in 1985 prices (US$8,519 in current prices), Malaysia managed to remain an upper middle income country. This chapter attempts to explain how Malaysia became an upper middle income country. Natural resources (minerals, forest products, and agriculture) and industrialization have been the prime routes taken by developing countries to reach middle income status. Major oil exporters such as the North African, Middle Eastern, and Venezuelan economies have relied almost exclusively on oil exports to record middle incomes. Oil has only been one of the exports that drove income growth in Brazil, Malaysia, and Mexico. The only developing countries to graduate into developed high income economies, i.e., Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, used manufacturing as the prime path to rapid Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth. Malaysia was no different from most developing countries as its economy was driven by plantation agriculture and tin mining during the British administration until the New Economic Policy (NEP) was launched. The Malaysian government recognized that the supply of natural resources would not be infinite and that dependence on agriculture alone could be catastrophic if the terms of trade are affected by the fallacy of composition problem.Hence, the approach the government took was to diversify primary exports and to stimulate manufacturing growth by attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) (Malaysia 1971). At the time the NEP was introduced, ethnic identification of the economy in Malaysia was sharp as the Bumiputeras populated mainly in the rural areas, the Chinese concentrated in urban business and mining, and the Indians confined to plantation agriculture and urban occupations as labourers. Coming after the bloodshed on 13 May 1969 that had threatened to erupt into an ethnic crisis, the NEP was crafted with the twin goals of alleviating poverty and restructuring the economy to remove ethnic identification.

Abstract. This article aims to identify and characterise the Turkish middle class. Our objective is to improve its description by implementing a clustering method combining an economic and a sociological approach. Using the Income and Living Conditions Survey (2014), we first identify the middle-class on the basis of an income interval. We then use information about employment and education to characterise the heterogeneity of this middle-income class. The distinctive behaviors and aspirations of four middle class groups are explored in depth by using the results of original qualitative field research carried out among middle class households from two contrasting regions. Keywords. Social stratification, Income distribution, Middle class, Turkey, Clustering methods. JEL. O15, D13, E25.

It is sometimes difficult to tell which group is more distressed about the purportedly deteriorating well-being of Canada’s middle class: Politicians courting middle-class voters, or the Canadians who actually identify as middle class. Even more difficult to discern is whether either group truly understands precisely who it is they are worrying about. There is no firm consensus on where the upper and lower boundaries of the middle class lie, with economists and statisticians disagreeing on the income levels and brackets that should be included in the definition of middle class, and some even arguing that income itself may be an inappropriate measure (preferring instead, for instance, consumption and lifestyle). And yet, despite all the conflicting approaches to measuring the middle class, what emerges from a review of the array of definitions and data sources is that the politicians and voters can at least partly justify their angst. While the middle class has seen its income grow, it has not kept pace with the income growth rate of higherearning groups. But not all members of the so-called middle class face the same plight. The workers who have lost the most ground relative to higher-income groups, are those with below-average human capital (that is, lower skill and education), and are at the lower end of the middle-income bracket. The largest source of downward pressure on middle-class incomes has been the decline of Canada’s manufacturing industry. Beginning in the postwar years, factory jobs developed a misplaced reputation for being well-paying middleclass work. In fact, the work provided generous pay and benefits only relative to the low human capital that was necessary to find employment in manufacturing. As manufacturing has declined across all industrialized countries, lower-skilled workers have been forced to accept lower rates of income growth. Meanwhile, more gains have been made by those with high levels of human capital. Public-sector professionals in particular have come to share the human-capital and income characteristics of Canada’s highest-paid managers and professionals, often enjoying greater job security as well. In reality, anxiety over the state of the middle class and its future is actually about the working class. Lumping middle-class factory workers and clerical assistants in with middle-class teachers and nurses — as current political discussion tends to do — obscures the truth about which members of that group are genuinely struggling to keep up. As long as politicians continue to promote policies aimed at helping everyone within such a vague and broad target group, they can only end up misdirecting resources by enriching those who are already doing reasonably well, rather than focusing on those working-class Canadians who truly are not. Already net transfers through the tax system to middle-income groups have grown markedly. These transfers have managed to offset about half the erosion of middle-class incomes in the marketplace. Those transfers have been financed through increased tax payments from high-income groups, but also through shrinking transfers to low-income groups. These developments raise serious policy issues for which there are no simple answers. The breadth of Canada’s middle class obviously means that it encompasses the largest proportion of families, by far. Any further policies aimed at transferring wealth from other income groups to appease middle-class voters will be costly. Given that the main cause for concern is the worsening situation of lowerskilled workers, politicians who truly want to help those struggling in the “middle class,” should focus their efforts on helping Canadians acquire more education and more skills.

The purpose of this article is to analyse the influence of social class on nutrition knowledge and food preferences among Chinese urban adults with an emphasis on the middle class. The empirical investigations conducted as part of this research are based on data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey for 2009. First, we propose a multidimensional definition of social class that combines income, occupation and education to highlight the heterogeneity of the Chinese middle class. We identify four distinct groups: the elderly and inactive middle class, the old middle class, the lower middle class and the new middle class. In a second step, we assess the influence of social class on nutrition knowledge and food preference indices. Our results show that adults belonging to the elderly and inactive middle class and to the new middle class have better nutrition knowledge and healthier food preferences than their poorer counterparts.

Why should we view Indonesia as an emerging power? There are a range of indicators supporting Indonesia’s status in international affairs. In the late 1990s analysts referred to Indonesia as a pivotal state.1 The McKinsey Report on Indonesia in 2012 predicted that by 2030, it will become the world’s seventh largest economy.2 In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, Indonesia even outperformed the BRIC countries, attracting investors searching for new emerging investment markets. A report released on 6 March 2013 by the Boston Consulting Group3 made a case for the archipelagic state of 242 million people as a prime investment destination. Memorable excerpts from the report noted that: 1) Indonesia’s middle income and affluent classes will double by 2020 from 74 million to 141 million people and more than half the population (53 per cent) will qualify as middle class or richer; 2) Indonesians feel more financially secure than people in other BRIC countries (Thirty-one per cent of Indonesians surveyed reported feeling secure, compared with only 14 per cent of Chinese, 19 per cent of Indians, 15 per cent of Russians and 13 per cent of Brazilians); and 3) Indonesia’s middle class will become more dispersed and consequently, new cities will emerge beyond Jakarta as centers of wealth. Here, the total number of cities with more than a million middle-income earners will roughly double, from 12 cities to 22 in seven years (see Chapter 3). A further expectation is that Indonesia will enjoy a demographic dividend during 2020–30 when its productive age group—people between 15 and 64 years of age—maximizes their economic productivity, and dependency ratios are at their lowest levels.4

Chutes & Ladders: Middle Class in Motion

The Mexican middle class has generally been neglected in academic literature. Dennis Gilbert’s Mexico’s Middle Class in the Neoliberal Era is an important addition to the few focused studies available on the Latin American middle class, for instance, Brian Owensby’s study of the Brazilian middle class during the Vargas era, Intimate Ironies; Soledad Loaeza’s Clases medias y política en México: La querella escolar; or Larissa Lomnitz and Ana Melnick’s Chile’s Middle Class: A Struggle for Survival in the Face of Neoliberalism. These studies find a necessary complement in Gilbert’s book on the Mexican experience after the economic crises of 1982 and 1994. Using interviews with middle-class Mexicans living in the city of Cuernavaca, Gilbert achieves insightful conclusions on this sector’s influential role behind the profound political and economic transformations of the country during the last 20 years, the period known as the neoliberal era.According to Gilbert’s analysis of data from electoral polls, most middle-class Mexicans voted for political change in 2000, favoring Vicente Fox, the PAN (National Action Party) candidate. Six years later, they reaffirmed their electoral preference for the center-right PAN as they voted for Luis Felipe Calderón. For Gilbert, rather than expressing an ideological trend, these outcomes demonstrated the middle-class’s goals of maintaining economic and political stability. According to Gilbert, after the 1994 financial crisis, the ruling PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) could no longer guarantee economic stability, and the PAN appeared as the new viable alternative for the disappointed Mexican middle class.Despite persistent income inequalities in the country, Gilbert finds that instead of decreasing during the neoliberal era, the middle class in fact expanded. Newer cars, larger houses, and more household appliances have become available for this social sector, evidencing relative economic stability for its members. Better education has also been available for middle-class young people, corresponding to the importance given by this sector to creating cultural and social capital.Education is one of the most important values for the Latin American middle class. Gilbert’s work on the Mexican middle class suggests that this sector values education above anything else. Even in the aftermath of the 1982 economic crisis, amid the implementation of the neoliberal model in the country, middle-class Mexicans limited expenses in different areas, but never in their children’s education. According to Gilbert, paying private school tuitions turned out to be a matter of middle-class survival and preservation of their standard of living.Gilbert’s analysis of the Mexican middle class is based on family households where the head falls into one of the upper white-collar categories and income exceeds 150 percent of the median household income in the country. While using this particular unit offers the advantage of grouping people sharing family income and general cultural traits, it neglects the importance of the educational status of single people, which is particularly important in defining the middle-class condition in Mexico, as elsewhere in Latin America. Many professionals and recent graduates live by themselves and are part of a middle class that is becoming typical of large urban areas such as Mexico City. This means that around 20 percent of middle-class households are not considered in Gilbert’s study (p. 114). This situation might not have a major effect on studying the family-oriented Cuernavaca middle class, but it would have a strong impact if we were to approach the complexities of the Mexican middle class in larger cities.Why was Cuernavaca’s middle class chosen for Gilbert’s study? He explains that Cuernavaca’s inhabitants come from different parts of Mexico and that this city congregates an important number of middle-class representatives, partly as a result of its proximity to Mexico City. Yet Gilbert recognizes that the families participating in his study “cannot be considered a statistically representative sample of middle-class Cuernavaca or middle-class Mexico” (p. 109). For example, a focus on the intellectual/academic/artistic and highly politicized middle-class group is practically absent from Gilbert’s sample of Cuernavaca. Informal merchants are not a part of the sample either. Because Mexico is a predominantly urban country, where most middle-class people live in big cities such as Mexico City, Guadalajara, Monterrey, and Querétaro, it would make sense to perform research on one of these large urban areas whose middle-class compositions show tremendous complexity and heterogeneity.Gilbert’s book offers a smart approach to the correlation between social class and recent political-economic issues that are becoming ever more important in Mexico. It is also a strong invitation to keep exploring and discussing the importance of this social sector in Mexican history.

The literature proposes that the participation among Malay middle income class in the Islamic Resurgence was significantly noticeable in helping the upsurge of Islamic consciousness in urban cities in Malaysia. How do they perceive this? How does the Malay middle income class obligate to Islamic teaching? This study aims to analyze the Malay middle income class’commitment to Islamic teaching based on their convictions and their participation in Islamic Resurgence and activities. Exploratory qualitative approach is used for this multidisciplinary historical and socio-religious research. Documentation of knowledge with five informants of the Malay middle income class was conducted through oral history. Samples were selected purposefully based on criterion sampling. The semi-structured in-depth interviews were tape-recorded, transcribed and analysed through content and descriptive analyses.Data showed significant roles played by the Malay middle income class in Islamic activities led to the revival of Islamic Resurgence in the urban areas. In general, Islamic Resurgence contributes to positive impacts on the Malay Muslim middle income class’ religious practices and commitments. The study indicated that the Islamic Resurgence contributes to the emergence of the great number of moderate Muslims and the progressive development of Islam in Malaysia.

The present study investigates the characteristics of class in two transitional societies as based on interviews in 474 homes. The author examines certain hypotheses (communication, mobility, rationalism, kinship, conformity, optimism, and marital adjustment) by which the middle class may differ in behavior from the lower class. While most of the hypotheses were supported statistically, the middle and lower classes in Central America vary greatly according to traditions and social pressures. J t has been popular to ask whethler there really exists a middle class in Latin America and hiow it may be defined.' The present article assumes the existence of the middle stratum and is concerned with some of its social and psychological characteristics. Interest is focused in the behavioral and attitudinal variables to be found in the lower and middle classes of two transitional societies. The discussion is primarily directed to the so-called middle class.2 It is the author's contention that this new stratum is a product of urbanization and industrialization abetted by commercialism and education. Although this thesis is hardly novel, it merits further investigation. However, the emphasis of the present study is directed to a comparison of class subcultures, rather than their development historically, in El Salvador and Costa Rica. The sample included 79 middle class interviews and * The present study developed out of a SmithMundt visiting professorship at the University of El Salvador in 1958 and a Science Research Council grant to return to Central America in 1960. The author is indebted to many individuals in both El Salvador and Costa Rica for the completion of this study. For some of the statistical calculations the author is grateful to Curtis R. Miller of Pacific State Hospital and to John R. B. Whittlesey of Questionnaire Analysis Program I of the University of California Medical Center, Los Angeles, California. 1 A few of the references on middle class would include Theodore R. Crevenaa, ed., Materiales para el Estudio de la Clase Media en la America Latina, 3 vols. (Publicaciones de la Oficina de Ciencias Sociales, Union Panamericana, Washington, D. C., 1950) ; Ralph L. Beals, Social Stratification in Latin America, The American Jotrnal of Sociology, LVIII (January 1953), 327339; Gino Germani, La Clase Media en la Ciudad de Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires: Instituto de Sociologia, 1952); and Andrew H. Whiteford, Two Cities of Lati America: A Comparative Description of Classes (Beloit, Wisconsin: Logan Museum of Anthropology, Beloit College, 1960), pp. 53-55. 2 Mario Monteforte Toledo, Guatemala, Monografia Sociologica (Mexico: Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Sociales, 1939), pp. 261-262. This content downloaded from 157.55.39.215 on Tue, 30 Aug 2016 04:18:14 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms